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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite appearing a long time ago in all ancient countries, external audit has only been 
conceptualised since the Industrial Revolution around 1780, in which the development 
of complex business structures was seeking for external-financing funds and 
demanding the disengagement of capital facilities and management. However, the 
objectives of external audit, along with its roles, have never reached a universal 
consensus, instead being constantly evolving under the influences of academic 
theorisations and contextual events. The evolution has provided a variety of notions 
about the functions of external audit, and even more divergently so since the 
emergence of financial regulations from a free market system in the financial industry. 
Therefore, it is of great necessity to foremost provide a theoretical and practical 
background to the conception of external audit, together with a review of banking 
regulations and supervisions, before suggesting contemporary and considerable 
matters of how the nature of external audit performs in the financial sector under the 
process of international banking regulations and supervisions, over the course of the 
introductory section. These concerns will in turn pose this research’s main objective 
of assessing the regulatory and supervisory development’s impact on the performance 
of external audit in the European banking system, thereby throwing a brighter light on 
the quality of external audit performed in the banking industry – a regulated market. 
Understanding the influences on external audit will not only assist the regulators in 
pursuing proper interventions, but also clear the doubt about regulators’ role in 
producing and allocating financial information. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
1.1.1. The theoretical role of external audit 
 
The public perceptions. The concept of auditing has only been methodically theorised 
through academic research since the 1920’s, as opposed to simply being shaped by 
public perceptions before that. Indeed, long before the 20th century, the perception of 
auditing was dominated by the Policeman Theory, a basic public notion, in which the 
role of auditing is deemed to be analogous to a policeman’s job of preventing and 
detecting fraud, differing only through focusing on arithmetical accuracy (Hayes et al., 
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2005, p. 44). By contrast, under the Lending Credit Theory – another public 
perception, auditing was primarily introduced to provide credibility to financial 
statements being used to enhance the stakeholders’ trust in management stewardship 
(Hayes et al., 2005, p. 45). The latter public belief can be marked as a transition in the 
theoretical objectives of auditing, from principally being fraud detection and 
prevention to significantly being verification of financial statements’ truth and 
fairness, as claimed by the succeeding theories proposed in academic research, such 
as the Theory of Inspired Confidence (Limperg, 1932) and Agency Theory (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1979). 
 
The initial academic conceptions. These successive notions were primarily 
concerned about determining the quality of financial information to reduce the 
problem of information asymmetry between management and stakeholders. However, 
different from the public perception, both these theories viewed the role of auditing 
systematically through both perspectives of supply and demand sides in an audit-
service market. More specifically, the theories addressed that the demand for audit 
services came from the demand of outside stakeholders for receiving fair and true view 
on financial information to monitor management. Meanwhile, on the supply side, the 
auditors were considered as a “confidential agent of the community”, obligated to fulfil 
the outsiders’ reasonable expectations, by Limperg (1932), but a mediator, bound by 
the shareholders (and creditors) to reduce agency costs, between managers (agents) 
and stakeholders (principals) from the perspectives of Watts & Zimmerman (1979). In 
addition, similar to the Lending Credit theory, the Agency Theory pointed out that the 
agents also had the willingness to contract to supply audited financial statements since 
their welfare was decided by the principals, who required reliable reports on how the 
agents operated the corporations to pursue the principals’ interests. It is manifest that 
although all aforementioned theories generally advocated the origin of auditing from 
the contractual arrangement between stakeholders and managers, the Agency Theory 
might be the one providing the most sufficient explanation about the role of auditing 
from both perspectives of the supply and demand sides. 
 
The theoretical explanations from the Agency Theory’s perspective. As a matter 
of fact, starting from the late 20th century, the notion of agency theory has been 
prominently used to discuss the role of auditing further. More particularly, drawing on 
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the contractual relationship of principal-agent, Wallace (1980) developed three 
hypotheses for “the economic role of the audit in free and regulated markets”. Through 
discussing the monitoring hypothesis, the information hypothesis, and the insurance 
hypothesis, the study aimed to provide a theoretical framework for the function of audit 
in different environments. Under the assumption that the principals never trusted the 
financial numbers reported by their agents, thus insisting on adjusting the agents’ 
income for perceived risks of losses, the first hypothesis advocated that the agents 
would willingly be checked to provide evidence that the reported information were 
cautiously prepared to avoid accidental and material misstatement errors, when the 
benefits from these monitoring activities exceeded the related costs. Supporting this 
hypothesis, the empirical studies of Chow (1977, 1982) showed that the probability of 
a firm’s voluntariness of hiring external auditing would increase with firm size, 
leverage, and number of accounting-based debt covenants to presumably indicate the 
stewardship responsibility of management to creditors and shareholders, as well as 
with the total number of employees to presumably indicate the stewardship 
responsibility of lower management to higher management. The evidence implied that 
the main stakeholders were inclined to consider the monitoring capability of an audit 
as a valued control mechanism.  
 
Meanwhile, the information hypothesis emphasised the role of audit in enhancing the 
quality of financial information, thereby reducing investment risks, facilitating internal 
and external decision-making, as well as improving earnings from trading and 
portfolio investment positions. Although being considered as an alternative to the 
former hypothesis, this hypothesis believed that regardless of whether or not the agent 
explicitly contracted with the principal to provide audited financial information, the 
demand for those pieces of information to estimate market values and to support 
rational investment decisions still existed. Indeed, a great deal of empirical studies, 
such as Beaver (1968) and Collins (1976), found that the information on financial 
results had value as they could either create abnormal trading gain under the 
circumstance of information asymmetries, or provide clarification of some 
uncertainties, thereby reinforcing the trust of outside investors under the condition of 
efficient markets. It is questionable whether the government should impose mandatory 
disclosure regulations on corporations to achieve the desired level of information 
production or let the market mechanism correct the failure of inefficiencies to reach 
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the target. Wallace (1980) argued for the freed-up mechanism against the intervened 
one, not only because a corporation could increase the level of disclosure based on the 
demand for product by non-stockholders just as a regulator could, but also because 
there were no guarantees that the result of the governmental intervention might be 
preferable to the market expectation. 
 
The last hypothesis took the management’s liability exposure as an explanation of how 
managers decided whether to contract with an audit. In light of the insurance 
hypothesis, the agent was prone to shifting the responsibility for reporting data to an 
audit with the aim of lowering the expected losses from litigation or related 
settlements. Wallace (1980) also expressed that “investment bankers, trustees, 
underwriters, lawyers, and managers who have professional liability exposure for their 
participation in financial activities involving disclosure practices have incentives to 
insure themselves via auditors' participation”. Therefore, it is reasonable to agree that 
the demand for an audit could stem from an increase in the need for insurance against 
potential litigation facing the management. Notwithstanding the overlaps with the two 
previous hypotheses in terms of considering an audit as a method of settling for 
discretionary practices of the agent, the insurance hypothesis was more capable of 
justifying the irreplaceable roles of an audit by the explanation for why the agent would 
not contract with an insurance company but an auditor. More particularly, an auditor 
not only provided professional and independent attestation, the specialised knowledge 
of disclosure problems, and the service of defending against liability suits, but also 
shared the common concern about reputation with the managers, as well as supporting 
in socialising business risk to the society through higher fees (Wallace, 1980). In 
alignment with the insurance hypothesis, Menon et al. (1994) provided an empirical 
evidence that auditors were deemed guarantors of the quality of financial information 
from Laventhol & Horwath clients, whilst another evidence from UK publicly quoted 
companies, given by Lennox (1999), illustrated that the larger the auditors were, the 
more likely they were liable to litigation.  
 
Going beyond the discussion on the economic role of audit in an unregulated 
environment, Wallace (1980) also shed new light on the effects of regulations on the 
market for auditing services. From his viewpoint, governmental interventions were set 
out to improve resource allocation through not only mitigating the opportunities to 
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exploit inside information and the unnecessary duplication of efforts, but also 
resolving the “free-rider” or information non-purchasers problem and the information 
asymmetry issue. Nevertheless, there was no assurance that the regulatory mechanism 
which aimed to achieve optimal information production decisions and to efficiently 
disseminate the produced information was better than the mechanism of the free 
market in which voluntary participations, assessments of the auditing costs, and 
auditing procedures would be driven by the monitoring, information, and insurance 
benefits, thus resulting in an expected allocation of resources. However, it is worth 
pointing out that the regulators’ self-interest in collecting information useful to them 
in performing their responsibilities was another reason for adopting a regulatory 
mechanism (Wallace, 1980), as it could imply that external audit also played a 
supporting role in the governmental oversight of more regulated sectors such as 
financial institutions. 
 
1.1.2. The practical role of external audit in the banking system 
 
Despite having different approaches to explaining the role of external audit, the 
conventional theories all promoted its importance to the mitigation of the principal-
agent problems, and undoubtedly considered the external audit as an independent 
mediator, who was supposed to furnish the users of financial information with true and 
fair views on corporations’ performance in general and managers’ in particular. In 
addition, it is manifest that these theories neither mentioned how the external audit and 
its responsibility should change in regulatory environments, nor completely approved 
of the governmental interventions in the process of information production.   
 
The practical evidence for the importance of external audit. In fact, the Savings 
and Loan crisis in 1980s, which led to an economic recession, initially revealed that 
the external audit should have been obligatory with the aim of deterring against 
corporate abuse, as the US Government Accountability Office (GAO, 1991) reported 
that 4 of the 39 failed banks during the crisis had never been audited, 23 of those had 
not been audited yet since the previous year, and 6 of these 23 banks had not been 
audited since the last two years before the collapse. However, it has never implied that 
the independence and objectivity of the external audit, as well as the creditability of 
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audited financial information, would be always reserved without further state 
interventions and supervision. 
 
The failures of external audit. Indeed, the affair of the Johnson Matthey Bankers 
Limited in 1984 forced the Bank of England to require the external audit to disclose 
issues of concerns, rather than preserving the duty of confidentiality between auditors 
and clients (Singh, 2007, p. 155). Meanwhile, the fraudulence of Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 was a strong attestation of an abdication of 
the external audit’s responsibility resting with the shareholders and the regulators, 
since whilst taking the role of an auditor for the bank, Price Waterhouse also gave an 
advice on accounting practices to support the bank in transferring treasury activities 
from the United Kingdom to Abu Dhabi and claiming a terminal loss to avoid tax 
liabilities (Singh, 2007, p. 156). As a result, a treasury loss of nearly 500 million US 
dollars, the equivalent of BCCI’s entire capitalisation (Brown & Kerry, 2011, p. 252), 
had been concealed as its treasury business was outside the remit of the Bank of 
England. Moreover, from the review of JDS tribunal in 2006, the external auditor, 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), failed to unveil BCCI’s ways of managing its 
performance in the annual audited reports, as PWC was incapable of not only 
disclosing the owner and lender relation of BCCI to ICIC Group, but also assessing 
whether the loan loss provisions reflected the level of lending and non-performing 
loans (Singh, 2007, p. 162). The conflict of interests between the auditing duties and 
the non-auditing duties became manifest after the bankruptcy of Barings Bank in 1995. 
Deloitte & Touche (D&T), the external auditor of Barings Bank, was negligent in not 
investigating the anomalies of the 88888 account, which Leeson created to hide the 
losses of unauthorised trading, as well as the issues of margin payments, the negligence 
contributing the collapse of Barings Bank (Singh, 2007, p. 167). It is of great 
importance to highlight the decision of the court against D&T for the damages to 
Barings Bank between 1992 and 1995, as D&T was only excused partially from 
liability and its negligence was deemed more of a technical and minor nature of 
auditing, the decision implying that the external audit is not an insurance against 
corporation losses, in contrast to the insurance theory.  
 
The trigger for the governmental interventions. In spite of the failures of auditors 
in the banking industry, there has been no official prohibition of providing non-audit 
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work to the audit client to improve the external auditors’ independence and to reduce 
overfamiliarity. One more time, the creditability of audited financial information has 
been doubted, this time even more highly, since the start of the global financial crisis 
and over the past decade, as they failed to report problems relating to bank assets, 
liabilities, risks and economic exposures in the distressed financial institutions’ 
balance sheets. Indeed, in the UK, the US, Germany, Iceland, The Netherlands, France, 
and Switzerland, there were 28 distressed financial institutions, which were publicly 
declared to have financial difficulties requiring state bailouts, although they had just 
received unqualified audit opinions provided by either one of the Big Four accounting 
firms in exchange for high audit fees (Sikka, 2009). In addition, most of these banks 
had also received non-auditing services from their auditors with noticeably high fees, 
thus leading to a doubt on audit independence (Sikka, 2009). This is not to mention 
that, in the context of the implementing of a new set of international banking 
regulations (based on Basel II) and the emerging financial instruments or derivatives 
in developed countries at this time, the recognitions of bank assets and liabilities on 
balance sheets, which were the bases for calculating banks’ risk exposures, had been 
becoming more and more complicated and difficult, the complexity to some extent 
motivating managerial discretion in capital level and earning management through 
loan loss provision accounts. The XIX Congreso Nacional de Auditoria questioned the 
failure of audit processes in detecting weaknesses in risk assessing and measuring 
(Ramos, 2010). Therefore, it is undeniable that the issuing of subjective and misstating 
audit reports was one of the most decisive causes of the sudden financial crisis, which 
happened without any earlier warnings, thus damaging the interests of banks’ 
customers, especially depositors. The erosion of external audit quality and 
independence called for the in-depth integration of alternative institutional 
arrangements into auditing financial institutions, the arrangements directly conducted 
by statutory regulators who have the legal authority to force their financial institutions 
into abiding by their regulations on banking operations.  
 
However, this does not mean that the duties of the external audit would be superseded 
by the role of banking supervisors, or that these two parties’ concerns would overlap 
rather than being complementary to each other, despite being related to the same 
matters. Indeed, Article 82, Principle 6, BCBS280 (2014) states that, “in order to 
discharge their respective statutory responsibilities, neither party should use the work 
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of the other as a substitute for its own work and the supervised entity should remain 
the main source of information for their respective work.” It is of great importance to 
highlight that, different from the guidelines of BCBS87 (2002) emphasising the 
aspects which banking supervisors should be concerned about when using audited 
financial statements in their supervisory activities, the current guidelines of BCBS280 
(2014) focus on encouraging indirect communications between external auditors and 
supervisors on significant matters relating to financial reporting, as well as mandatory 
direct communications between these two parties on extended audit reports covering 
assignments regarding prudential supervisory requirements. Not only is it manifest that 
the process of the external audit for banks would be overseen by banking supervisors, 
but it also seems that the scope of the external audit would go beyond the assurance of 
financial statements in order to extend and meet supervisory requirements. 
 
1.1.3. The international banking regulations and supervisions 
 
Considered as a response to the 1980’s banking crisis, the foundation of Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was agreed by the central banks’ 
regulatory authorities and governors from the Group of Ten countries (G10), with a 
commission to strengthen financial liability through implementing the unified 
regulation and supervision standards, known as Basel Accords, in the banking systems 
at the international scale.   
 
Basel I. As the foundation stone of this standardisation, Basel I or the Basel Capital 
Accord, put forth in 1988, required commercial banks to keep the regulatory capital 
amounting to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 1988). Particularly, 
Basel I limited general loan loss reserves included in Tier 2 capital to be 1.25% of risk-
weighted assets. This 1.25% requirement was met by banks in the US, whilst other 
countries’ bank regulators also had the freedom to go over this threshold in accordance 
with the perceived regulatory need of their own countries’ banking system. The 
requirement could generate a motivation for raising the loan loss provision (LLP) 
estimates to satisfy the regulatory level of capital.  Furthermore, Basel I did not take 
into account the possible changes in the borrow categories’ creditworthiness during 
the loan facility’s life span, whereas in fact, the LLP estimates for the categories were 
risk-adjusted on a continuous basis to cope up with the borrowers’ changes in 
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creditworthiness, not to mention applying the fixed risk weights for all categories of 
different borrowers, such as individuals and corporations. As a result, the LLP 
estimates became backward-looking and procyclical, as the banks had insufficient 
LLPs and regulatory capital requirements (Bikker & Hu, 2002; Danielsson et al., 
2001). Besides, according to Jackson et al. (1999), another criticism was that Basel I 
was procyclical with changing economic conditions, due to the fact that banks would 
try to decrease lending (and other risky activities) during difficult periods in order to 
preserve a lesser amount of regulatory capital. This practice was deemed unacceptable 
by bank regulators, who wished the banks to maintain higher capital buffers during 
difficult periods, since it would prompt banks to overstate their specific reserves in an 
attempt to make up for their low regulatory capital ratio. This would in turn lead to 
more procyclicality in the financial system, since bank profit was reduced even further 
when provisions were exceedingly increased (Ahmed et al., 1999; Borio et al., 2001, 
pp. 1-57; Cavallo & Majnoni, 2002, pp. 319-342). Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) also 
agreed that in the scenario of a prolonged financial recession, with increased LLPs 
came decreased bank profit, depleted bank capital and more severe recession. 
Consequently, the Basel I capital standard needed a revision. 
 
Basel II. According to BCBS (2004), Basel I was revised into Basel II and enacted in 
the Group of Ten countries, with the main purpose of instigating a new and more risk-
sensitive methodology of determining the required amount of minimum capital in 
order to absorb losses (and credit losses in particular). There were three building pillars 
that Basel II was based on: minimum capital requirements, regulatory supervision, and 
market discipline (BCBS, 2004). Amongst these, Pillar 1 detailed the methodology to 
determine the requirement for minimum capital, keeping it at 8% of risk-weighted 
assets, albeit requiring the coverage of market risks and operation risks in the capital 
adequacy ratio, as well as a significant modification in the way of classifying assets 
and measuring their risks, thus implying a more stringent regulatory capital ratio than 
in Basel I. Particularly, there were three approaches to determining this minimum 
requirement for banks: the internal rating-based (IRB) approach, the standardised 
approach (SA) and the advanced measurement approach. In the first approach, IRB, 
banks were required to carry out their own credit risk assessment of the borrowers to 
come up with their corresponding risk weights, and were supposed to make sure that 
their LLRs were able to fully cover the expected losses. In the case the eligible reserves 
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could not, the differences had to be deducted from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (50% each). 
In the other case when the expected losses were less than the eligible reserves, the 
difference should be recognised in Tier 2 capital, but not more than 0.6% of the risk-
weighted assets. Meanwhile, in the second approach, banks were supposed to base 
their risk weights on external credit ratings and also to reserve at maximum of 1.25% 
of the risk-weighted assets for loan loss provisions. Lastly, the advanced measurement 
approach let banks pick a methodology of risk assessment for their own, as long as it 
was comprehensive and systemic enough. In general, Pillar 1 of Basel II served the 
purpose of making sure that unexpected losses were covered by bank capital, and 
expected losses were covered by loan loss reserves (Majnoni et al., 2004). However, 
Basel II still could not escape the criticism for being procyclical regarding fluctuating 
economic conditions, according to Turner (2000), Borio et al. (2001, pp. 1-57), 
Danielsson et al. (2001), Segoviano and Lowe (2002), Repullo et al. (2010). 
 
Basel III. Basel III (BCBS, 2010) called for the full introduction in June 2018 of the 
system for loan loss provisioning called ‘through-the-cycle’, which was similar to 
Basel II in the way it anticipated loan losses before they materialised. The difference 
was that Basel II allowed provisioning at only a certain point in time (e.g. the beginning 
of the year, quarterly, semi-annually, etc.), which was also the main reason for its 
criticism from Hull (2012) and Wezel et al. (2012). Improving on this, Basel III has 
brought about a provisioning system demanding banks (as well as other financial 
institutions) to reserve specific provisions for newly-originated loans, following 
characteristics specific to the individual borrowers and determine the loan’s 
performance (Wezel et al., 2012). In other words, each specific loan will be determined 
a corresponding level of LLPs, basing on a number of criteria specific to each bank 
and each borrower, even if the loan has not been impaired or the likelihood for such 
impairment in the future is low (Wezel et al., 2012). Basel III enables banks to improve 
their LLP estimates’ quality firstly by increasing the quality of the data generating 
provisions buffers, and secondly by instigating the so-called ‘through-the-cycle’ LLP 
estimates. Through the first mechanism, in addition to being able to obtain collateral 
data with optimal quality, banks are free from the flaws in existing LLP processes and 
models, particularly the ones leading to too high or low buffers. This results in more 
space for discretionary practices in provisions for each category, thus helping reduce 
the difference between provisioning and expected losses. In the meantime, the second 
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mechanism warrants that for banks which adopt the ‘through-the-cycle’ approach with 
respect to estimates of probability of default (PD) and expected losses (EL), their LLP 
estimates can have higher accuracy and less volatility. According to (Wezel et al., 
2012), a significant amount of discretion will be retained by banks in determining LLP 
estimates and following this, bank managers are expected to make sure that the 
applying of Basel III standards is backed up by solid risk management considerations. 
It is claimed that this provisioning system (i.e. the ‘through-the-cycle’ system) is better 
in anticipating loan losses, whilst also aligning with the principles of Basel II (Angelini 
et al., 2015; Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2010). However, it should be noted that 
since each bank’s situation is different from each other, there is not likely to be an 
approach in implementing this new provisioning model that can be ideal and fit all 
banks. Specifically, the banks’ numbers and kinds of applicable levers may vary from 
each other, corresponding to their asset composition, proportion of securitised assets, 
etc., and also to whether they have applied the measures introduced by Basel III even 
before the official implementation date 1st January 2022. 
 
1.1.4. The context of the banking regulations and supervisions in European Union 
Area 
 
Considering the development of banking regulations in the European Union (EU) 
banking system, it started with the implementing of the Basel Capital Accord, known 
as Basel I, through the issuing of Capital Adequacy Directive (93/6/EEC). However, 
the CAD did not require the EU banks to limit their loan loss reserve to be 1.25% of 
risk-weighted assets. This directive was replaced by Capital Requirement Directives I 
(2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC), Capital Requirement Directives II (2009/111/EC, 
2009/27/EC, and 2009/83/EC), and Capital Requirement Directive III (2010/76/EU), 
the CRDs considered as the implementation of Basel II in the European banking 
system with a Single Market context.  
 
Directly imposed on both credit institutions and investment firms, these directives 
required financial institutions to assure the adequacy of their internal capital, with 
respect of quantity, quality, and distribution. In light with Basel II, the Article 57 
Directive (2006/48/EC) obligated financial institutions in Member States to ensure the 
minimum level of bank capital at 8% of their amounts of risk-weighted exposures not 
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only to credit risks as required in CAD, but also to operational and market risks. The 
CRDs also differentiated between original own funds and additional own funds 
through setting the limits on the amount of additional own funds and on their certain 
items not to exceed respectively 100% and 50% of the original own funds in Paragraph 
30 and Article 66 Directive (2006/48/EC). According to Article 57 Directive 
(2006/48/EC), original own funds consisted of paid-up capital, reserves, retained 
earnings and funds for general banking risks, whilst the latter funds comprised 
revaluation reserves, value adjustments, and subordinated term debt. It is worth noting 
that although considered as items of additional own funds with the lower quality, 
revaluation reserves and value adjustments were still expected to be available for 
unrestricted and immediate utilisation in covering risks or losses, along with the items 
of original own funds, in accordance with Article 61 Directive (2006/48/EC). In light 
with the Directive, Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS, 2006) 
emphasised three key prudential criteria for the assessment on capital’s eligibility for 
being original own funds: permanence, capability of fully absorbing losses, and 
payment flexibility as to the amount and timing distributions, together with being 
issued and fully paid-in.  
 
In alignment with Basel II, these directives also instructed the three methods, the 
Standardised Approach, the Basic Internal Rating-Based Approach, and the Advanced 
Internal Rating-Based Approach. Whilst the first method required banks to rely on 
external rating agencies, certified by their supervisors, to assign risk weights to their 
claims, the second and third ones allowed banks to use their own risk assessments. In 
the CRDs, it is noticeable that under the Standardised Approach, the specific limit of 
1.25% of risk-weighted exposure amounts on loan loss reserves as banks’ own capital 
had not still been decreed. However, under the Internal Rating-Based Approaches, if 
the subtractions of the expected loss amounts from the sum of value adjustment and 
provision resulted in negative amounts, the difference would be deducted from the 
own funds (but this is still up to the discretion of the Member States), according to 
Article 61 Directive (2006/48/EC); on the contrary, if the result was positive, the 
difference would be added into the own funds but the added amounts must not exceed 
0.6% of risk-weighted exposure amounts, according to Article 63 Directive 
(2006/48/EC). 
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Nevertheless, the deficiencies of the new capital framework, revealed during the 
financial crisis, still existed, thus leading to the demand for replacement. Since 2013, 
Capital Requirement Directive IV (2013/36/EU), together with Capital Requirement 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, drawing on Basel III, has been adopted to replace the 
previous directives. More specifically, the Regulation re-defined the concept of own 
funds, together with demanding stricter own funds requirements, in order to enhance 
the quality of capital with a better capability of absorbing losses, whilst the Directive 
IV introduced capital conservation and countercyclical capital buffers, with the aim of 
mitigating the procyclical effects of financial regulation.  
 
According to the CRR, Tier 1 capital, which would be comprised of Common Equity 
Tier 1 (CET1) and Additional Tier 1 (AT1), shall combine with Tier 2 capital to form 
the own funds of an institution. Although the minimum requirement for the own funds 
has still been maintained at 8% of the total risk-weighted assets, financial institutions 
must be obligated to ensure the specific requirements for Tier 1 capital at 6% and 
CET1 at 4.5%, under Article 92 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, together with the 
capital conservation buffer of CET1 at 2.5% and the countercyclical capital buffer 
designated between 0% and 2.5%, under respectively Article 129 and Article 136 
Directive (2013/36/EU),. It should be stressed that notwithstanding that retained 
earnings, in addition to paid-in shareholder capital, shall be recognised as one of the 
main items of CET1, interim and year-end profits shall only be included in CET1 when 
those profits have been verified by independent auditors, and the deductions of any 
foreseeable charge or dividend from those profits have been demonstrated persuasively 
to the competent authority (Paragraph 2 of Article 26 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013). 
Nevertheless, it is expected that these requirements could influence the discretionary 
decisions of financial institutions on provisioning loan losses in favour of the 
enhancement of retained earnings. This is not to mention that the discretionary 
tendency could also be induced by the limits on the amounts of general credit risk 
value adjustments (general loan loss reserves), which not only have been regulated 
under the Internal Rating-Based Approach since the previous directives, but also shall 
be available under the Standardise Approach with a maximum of 1.25% of risk-
weighted exposure, according to Article 62 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.  
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In addition, aligning with Basel III, the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
183/2014 (or Regulation Technical Standards), the supplement to Regulation (EU) No 
575/2013, again emphasised that general credit risk adjustments must be freely 
available to cover subsequently materialised losses in respect of timing and amount, 
i.e., general loan loss reserves taken as the own funds must hold against future, 
presently unidentified losses, or at least a gone-concern basis, stemming from credit 
risks which have not been materialised yet. Simultaneously, general credit risk 
adjustments must be capable of reflecting credit risk losses from a group of exposures 
with no current evidence for the occurrence of a loss event (Article 1 (2b) Regulation 
(EU) No 183/2014). Based on these two criteria, general credit risk adjustments would 
be distinguished from specific credit risk adjustments, which would be ineligible to be 
included in the own funds under the Standardised Approach, and would be to some 
extent included under the Internal Rating-Based Approaches, in accordance with 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. What is more, following the framework of Basel III, 
the Regulations also required that financial institution must identify a level of specific 
credit risk adjustments for each type of exposure or a single obligor. 
To sum up, the stringency in the development of EU banking regulations has been 
undeniable, as financial institutions have been obligated to improve their capital levels 
in terms of both quality and quantity gradually. Although the minimum regulatory 
capital ratio has been set at 8%, the requirements for the calculation of this ratio have 
become stricter and stricter. It must be stressed that notwithstanding that the 
requirements aims to enhance the credibility and capability of loss-absorbing capital, 
they have still provided spaces for managerial discretions as financial institution could 
use their own assessment on measuring and classifying risks. The changes in the 
European banking legislations are summarised in Table 1.1.4, together with the 
judgments on their influences on loan loss provisioning practices. 
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Table 1. Summary of the development of banking regulations in the EU banking system 
Before 2005 Capital Adequacy Directive (Basel I) 
CAR = 8%  
• Only covering credit risks  
• Based on the regulatory classification of bank 
assets, corresponding to different risk weights 
• Applying the fixed set of risk weights for all 
categories of different borrowers 
• No adjustment in the borrow categories’ 
creditworthiness during the loan facility’s life 
Loan loss reserves: 
• Backward-looking and procyclical loan loss 
provisions estimates 
• Included in the calculation of CAR, without 
restriction 
➢ Putting pressure on banks, especially 
low capitalised ones, to satisfy the 
capital requirements, thus probably 
inducing capital managements 
through provisioning loan losses as 
there was no restriction on the 
inclusion of loan loss reserves. 
2006 – 2012 CRD I, CRD II, and CRD III (Basel II) 
CAR = 8% 
• Covering credit risks, market risks and operational 
risk 
• Modifying assets classification and risk assessment 
through Internal Ratings-Based Approaches (IRB) 
(using banks’ own risk assessments) or 
Standardised Approach (SA) (using certified 
external rating agencies’ assessments) 
The own funds: 
• The difference between original own funds and 
additional own funds 
Loan loss reserves: 
• Ensuring the full coverage of expected losses 
• Under Standardised Approach: no specific limit on 
the inclusion of loan loss reserves in banks’ own 
capital  
• Under IRB Approaches: deducting the negative 
amount (from the subtractions of the expected loss 
amounts from loan loss reserves) from the own 
funds; adding the positive amount up to 0.6% of 
risk-weighted exposures  
➢ Still imposing the challenge of CAR 
at 8% because of the requirements of 
covering operational and market 
risks, in addition to credit risk, and 
constraining on additional own funds 
whose quality is considered lower 
than that of original own funds 
➢ Not limiting on the inclusion of loan 
loss reserves but requiring the risk 
assessments to be based on the 
external assessments on risks, under 
the Standardised Approach 
➢ Still giving the space for managerial 
discretions as the risk assessments 
are conducted by banks under IRB 
Approaches, though the approaches 
have constraints on the inclusion of 
loan loss reserves 
➢ Thus, deterring EU banks from the 
capital management in favour of loan 
loss provisions, but not of earnings. 
2013 – 2019 onwards: CRD IV and CRR (Basel III) 
CAR = 8%: 
• Tier 1 Capital = 6%  
• CET1 = 4.5%  
• Capital Conservation Buffer = 2.5% 
• Countercyclical Capital Buffer designated between 
0% and 2.5% by the authority 
• Requiring the verification of interim and year-end 
profits before including those profits in CET1, and 
the persuasive demonstration of deducting any 
foreseeable charge or dividend from those profits 
 
➢ Still resting with ECB to satisfying 
with the CAR at 8% because of the 
requirements of the quality of capital 
sources 
➢ Requiring the assessment on the 
credibility and availability of interim 
and year-end profit before the 
inclusion in the own funds 
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Loan loss reserves:  
• Distinguishing general loan loss reserves from 
specific loan loss reserves 
• Applying specific loan loss reserves for each type of 
exposure or a single obligor 
• Under Standardised Approach: the specific limit of 
1.25% on the inclusion of general loan loss 
reserves in banks’ own capital; the exclusion of 
specific loan loss reserves from the own capital 
• Under IRB Approaches: deducting the negative 
amount (from the subtractions of the expected loss 
amounts from general and specific loan loss 
reserves) from the own funds; adding the positive 
amount up to 0.6% of risk-weighted exposures; 
including specific loan loss reserves in the own 
funds to some extent 
 
➢ Giving space for discretions 
regarding specific loan loss reserves, 
though limiting on the inclusion of 
loan loss reserves, under both 
approaches 
➢ Attempting to discourage EU banks 
from the capital management both in 
favour of loan loss provisions and 
earnings. 
 
 
As regards which governmental organisation in each country should be responsible for 
banking supervisions and regulations, it is conventional that the central bank will play 
the supervisory and regulatory roles, as it possesses the monetary authority. The story 
was different for Eurozone countries, as the central banks of which, despite still having 
the responsibility for overseeing their financial institutions, did not own the monetary 
authority, which instead was owned by the European Central Bank (ECB). During the 
development of the global financial crisis, many distressed European banks needed the 
financial support from their central banks, which had no control over the Euro currency 
to conduct quantitative easing. This led to a sovereign debt problem, along with a 
contractionary fiscal policy followed by economic recessions, as the national central 
banks borrowed money from the ECB to bail out their financial institutions. More 
importantly, “due to the interconnected nature of modern financial systems, one 
country rapidly spilled over national borders, causing financial distress in other EU 
countries” (European Court of Auditors, 2016), not to mention that cross-border flows 
of goods, services, capital and labour amongst European Union member states made 
the national economic recessions become the downturn of the whole European market. 
Therefore, it was only after the aftermath of the financial crisis had happened to reveal 
the deficiency in the institutional architecture of the European economic and monetary 
union, in which despite sharing a single market, there were no common supervision 
and regulation for European banks, that the establishment of a European banking union 
was introduced in 2012. Following that, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 
comprising the European Central Bank and the national supervisory authorities (NSA), 
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was introduced in 2013 and has been operating as the single supervisor of all financial 
institutions in participating European Union (EU) Member States since 2014. More 
specifically, all financial institutions in EU countries have been obligated to participate 
in the SSM, whilst it is voluntary for non-eurozone EU Member States to be 
participants.  
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
In the context of more integration of the supervisory arrangements for auditing the 
banks, more stringency of the regulatory requirements for the EU banking system and 
more complexity in banks’ exposure estimates, external auditors have been put under 
increasing pressure, as they are required to not only satisfy the regulatory supervisors’ 
requirements for the out-of-statutory-audit scope, but also understand the new 
complicated and varied internal assessment systems for classifying assets and 
measuring risks for asset portfolios. The complication has provided banks’ managers 
more space for earnings management, thus raising the risk of material misstatements 
on bank assets for external auditing, whilst the stringency can motivate them to 
practice capital management. For instance, recognising less amounts of loan loss 
provisions increases reported earnings, which is a part of the numerator of capital 
adequacy ratios. Simultaneously, it can heighten capital adequacy ratios, when current 
loan loss reserves included in the capital level reaches the limit level. Otherwise, 
banks’ managers can recognise more amounts of loan loss provisions to enhance 
reported regulatory capital, when the unproportionate reduction on retained earnings 
(due to tax deduction) is smaller than the provision amount included in the capital 
level. Thereby, both these practices are influenced the informativeness of financial 
statements, as well as the quality of accounting data. If such managers’ discretions 
cannot be detected and corrected by external auditors, irrespective of what the reason 
is, either the complexity not met by adding more audit efforts or the persuasion of the 
bank managers, the audited consolidated financial statements will become incapable 
of reflecting the financial difficulties of the audited banks. Indeed, the review of the 
practical roles of external audit illustrated the consecutive failures of the external audit 
as an independent mediator between managers and stakeholders through alleviating 
the asymmetric problem.  
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Therefore, the practical context is open to dispute whether stricter banking regulations 
and supervisions for the EU banking system would have favourable or unfavourable 
impacts on external audit’s quality of reported loan loss provisions. A reasonable 
answer for this question will also contribute an evidence for the needs of governmental 
interventions to control the creditability of financial information provided by the 
external audit (in other words, whether the responsibility of external audit towards the 
users of financial statements should be in control of the regulators). With the purposes 
of assessing the impact of banking regulations and supervisions on external audit in 
the EU banking system, the study will seek to answer three questions as follows: 
 
1. How did banking regulations and supervisions of the European Central Bank 
affect the performance of external audit?  
2.  To what extent was the performance of external audit improved as capital and 
earnings management practices were alleviated by stringent banking regulations and 
supervisions in the European banking system? 
3. Were there differences in the effect on the performance of external audit 
through increasing external audit efforts due to the different degrees of the European 
Central Bank’s oversight? 
 
The current paper will follow this order: Chapter 2 introduces a theoretical and 
empirical review of related current literature, Chapter 3 conveys the research 
methodology, including the data description and estimation approach, whilst Chapter 
4 examines the estimations’ results and Chapter 5 delivers the conclusions. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
With the purpose of reinforcing the resilience of banks to financial slumps, banking 
regulations and supervisions have been heightened; however, the stringency could 
induce managerial discretions, thus giving more challenge for external audit. On the 
other hand, the state intervention in information production and allocation could help 
improve the audit quality through supervising the process of external auditing and 
giving external audit parties an authority to access more information of banks. This 
paper will initially bring about a review of the current literature regarding the audit 
quality, in order to point out which proxy should be used to measure the quality of 
external audit and the rationale behind that. Furthermore, the literature review will 
illustrate the linkage between the conventional proxy of audit quality with the 
discretionary practices of capital and earnings managements, to highlight why the 
proxy is a matter to indicate the performance of external audit. Last but not least, it is 
important to view the current studies providing evidence of the regulatory impacts on 
the performance of external audit. 
 
2.2 The quality of external audit 
 
Since current literature did not seem to have an agreement regarding a measure 
representative for audit quality, the quality of audited financial statements was turned 
to for this purpose. The behind reasoning was that they could be linked to audit quality, 
as in the case management produced information with some material distortions in it, 
these distortions would be corrected by the auditors. It is advisable to suggest that audit 
quality could be reflected via a measure indicating the quality of accounting 
information. 
 
Standing at this viewpoint, the detection of management practices through 
discretionary accruals can be taken as a benchmark for the performance of external 
audit, as the role of external audit is defined as an intermediate information 
examination forestalling opportunistic manipulation of the management, thus 
disclosing true and fair views on financial information. There were ample studies 
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utilising this proxy to indicate audit quality related to the information of earnings, such 
as Heninger (2001), Dang (2004), Bedard and Johnstone (2004), Gul et al. (2009), and 
Kallapur et al. (2010), albeit applying different model specifications for discretionary 
accrual estimates. According to Heninger (2001), the underlying reason for using the 
utilisation of earnings management as an indication for audit quality was that such 
practice has been a source of worry for regulators, due to its potential to negatively 
affect the quality of financial disclosure. He also noticed that the act of earnings 
management (even without being considered as fraud) intervened directly in the 
process of financial disclosure, with the purpose of bringing about benefits for some 
specific agents and not of keeping the disclosure neutral and fair (Heninger, 2001). 
From the stance of Kallapur et al. (2010), this measure enabled not only the specific 
analysis of exceptional scenarios (e.g. restatements or ongoing issues) but also the 
more general and comprehensive one of the whole problem. Dang (2004) further stated 
that with higher quality audits came higher prospect of discovering and preventing 
managerial discretions, thus implying that auditors who fail to uncover earnings 
management can also be considered low quality. This might be evidenced in the 
findings by Bedard and Johnstone (2004), which claimed that the auditors tended to 
put in more efforts and raise their service fees upon discovering evidence of risk of 
accounting manipulation. Ultimately, the auditors are expected by the agents and 
parties interested to curb such a practice in order to retain the fairness and truth. In the 
case the auditors fail to limit the management’s attempt to inflate the results in order 
to cover disadvantageous information, the resulting financial reports also fail to warn 
about the issues. 
 
Although there have been a great deal of accounting literature focusing on audit quality 
since DeAngelo’s research (1981), there were only a few studies on the performance 
of external audit in financial and banking industries, as noted by Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2009, 2010, 2011), Dahl (2013), Dantas and Medeiros (2014), Krishnan and Zang 
(2014). The researches shared the common conclusion about the relationship of 
(discretionary) LLPs with external audit. Whilst Kannagaretnam et al. (2009) found 
that small US banks, which had greater earnings management through LLPs, would 
pay higher total fee to their auditors, the results of Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) indicated 
that the probability of bank failure would be lowered for a bank audited by reputable 
auditors, and having less LLPs. Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) resulted in a significant 
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evidence that the banking expertise of external auditors would mitigate information 
asymmetry through enhancing information relating to discretionary LLPs. Using a 
partial adjustment model, Dahl (2013) came out with the findings that the target ratios 
of LLPs of unaudited banks were lower than those of audited banks. Meanwhile, 
examining the context of Brazilian banking institutions, Dantas and Medeiros (2014) 
discovered that audit quality, measured by the absolute value of changes in 
discretionary LLPs, was not significantly associated with neither the degree of banking 
specialisation, nor the degree of audit activity concentration, nor the short-term client 
relationship, but was empirically confirmed to have negative relationships with the 
client importance and with long-term working tenure, as well as positive relationship 
with the establishment of the Audit Committee. Capturing the context of the global 
financial crisis in which audit fees were negotiated to be lower, Krishnan and Zhang 
(2014) suggested that there were no needs to worry about the cut of audit fees leading 
to reductions in audit quality because of lower audit effort, as the empirical results 
illustrated that negative discretionary LLPs (, which increase income) would decrease, 
and the relation between current LLPs and future loan charge-offs would become 
stronger, in audit fee cuts. 
 
2.3 Capital management practices 
 
The premise for capital management through LLPs is that provisions are a mechanism 
for bank managers to avoid the cost related to any non-compliance of capital adequacy 
requirements. It is worth noticing that the aforementioned 1.25% of risk-weighted 
assets limit suggests that general LLPs (within Tier 2 capital) have a restricted role, 
whereas retained earnings fall within Tier 1 capital, leading to conflicting 
consequences for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital in the case of increases in LLPs. More 
particularly, increased LLPs reduce Tier 1 capital (through reducing retained 
earnings), whilst raising Tier 2 capital (as a result of larger loan-loss reserves) for the 
banks that fall below the 1.25% threshold. As such, the eventual net effect is up to the 
quantity of general loan-loss reserves. However, empirical studies regarding the 
utilisation of this accounting accrual by bank managers with the aim of dealing with 
required capital ratios mostly focused on banks in the US and did not produce 
consistent results. A research by Ng and Roychowdhury (2011) studied how the adding 
of loan loss reserves back to regulatory capital in 2007 correlated with US banks’ 
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failure risk and other performance measures in the three years following 2007, 
reaching a conclusion that there was a positive correlation between them, especially 
for banks that were less constrained from their accounting discretion as a means to 
raise their regulatory capital. This finding suggested that the inclusion of loan loss 
reserves as Tier 2 capital would bring potentially dysfunctional consequences exposing 
banks to the risk of failure during an economic downturn period, the suggestion 
arguing against the ideology that loan loss reserves could generate buffer to mitigate 
the risk of failure. 
 
There are some studies using data from before Basel I was enacted that claimed LLPs 
were used as an instrument to manage regulatory capital. Examining the 150 US 
commercial banks’ data on a quarterly basis from 1976:Q1 to 1987:Q1, Scholes et al. 
(1990) concluded that banks who had low capital ratios raised their regulatory capital 
by either deferring losses or realising security gains, accepting to pay higher taxes 
because of this. Meanwhile, Moyer (1990) provided an evidence of a significantly 
negative relationship between LLPs and regulatory capital from 142 US banks over 
the period from 1981 to 1986, which implied that bank managers were inclined to 
upward adjust their banks’ LLPs when the difference between their banks’ primary 
capital adequacy ratios and regulatory minimum ratios declined. Innovating a new 
methodology which took into consideration the synchronicity of account, financing 
and making operating decisions, Beatty et al. (1995), using the panel data of 148 US 
banks from 1986 to 1989, found that both loan quality assessment and capital 
management decisions were reflected negatively through LLPs and positively through 
loan charge-offs. On the contrary, the empirical results of Collins et al. (1995) 
illustrated that capital favourably affected LLPs, as shown in the fact that bank 
managers had a tendency to lower LLPs (as opposed to raising them) when faced with 
low bank capital and they also preferred write-offs to LLPs as a means of managing 
capital ratios, through investigating the research sample of 160 US banks from 1971 
to 1991. 
 
As for the researches that studied the data after 1988 (when the capital adequacy 
regulation was effective), Kim and Kross (1998) found evidence supporting the capital 
management hypothesis: after the enactment of Basel I, there was a tendency at low 
capital banks to lower their LLP estimates in order to satisfy the new capital standards, 
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whereas there were no significant changes in the loan-loss provisioning at high capital 
banks, from the U.S market. Ahmed et al. (1999) suggested that LLP estimates were 
determined by the incentives toward capital management whilst reflecting adjustments 
in the expected quality of loan portfolio. Although providing some evidence for the 
capital management hypothesis, Anandarajan et al. (2007) indicated that this behaviour 
remained unchanged after the implementations of Basel I and II by studying data from 
Australian commercial banks. In alignment with Collins et al. (1995), Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008), applying the generalised method of moments (GMM), came out with 
the conclusion that the poorly capitalised banks, amongst the 186 European banks of 
which data they used to research pro-cyclical behaviour over the period 1992-2004, 
were less willing to generate LLPs as a means of managing regulatory capital. By 
contrast, Leventis et al. (2011) found no evidence for the capital management 
hypothesis after studying the sample of 91 European listed banks from 1999 to 2008 
to find how they managed bank capital using LLPs in response to the implementation 
of IFRS, with the pooled OLS and fixed-effects models for the main analysis and 
robustness test, respectively. Meanwhile, the research of Curcio and Hansan (2015), 
capturing two periods 1996-2006 and 2007-2010, reached the same result with 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) for non-Euro Area banks rather than for Euro Area ones, 
when using the regulatory-capital dummy variable defined by Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008); however, when using total capital ratio, the estimation results were aligned 
with those of Leventis et al.(2011) for either non- or Euro Area institutions. Solely 
performing pooled-OLS analyses on commercial and savings banks within the 27 
European Union Member States from 2005 to 2010, Garsva et. al (2012) approved the 
hypothesis of regulatory capital management in the way that banks with lower current 
capital ratios were apt to lessen LLPs throughout the next year, for the whole sample, 
and for the sub-samples such as EU-15, Southern Europe, Central Europe and 
Eurozone.  
 
2.4 Earning management practices 
 
Earnings management is defined as the practice of manipulating the reported earnings 
so that the profit and loss account is not representative of the actual economic situation 
of a bank. Amongst the different types of earnings management, income smoothing is 
aimed at lowering net profit’s variability over time, by increasing LLPs when earnings 
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are high and decreasing them otherwise. Motivations for income smoothing can be to 
adjust the bank’s performance to fit a mean specific to that firm (Collins et al., 1995) 
or the average of other banks (Kanagaretnam et al., 2005). Regarding the reasoning 
behind this practice, Bhat (1996) pointed out that income smoothing improved the 
regulators’ perception of a bank’s risk, helped steadying the managers’ compensation, 
allowed them to maintain stable dividends to stockholders, reduced earnings volatility 
and thus kept the banks’ stock price stable. 
 
Although the reasoning behind income smoothing in the financial reporting of 
industrial firms have been studied extensively in literature such as Barnea et al., (1975) 
Ronen and Sadan (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995); Goel and Thakor (2003), it is 
still relevant to refer to literature in banking for a special insight: in this field, income 
smoothing can also be studied from the perspective of the supervisory authority. This 
is appropriate since the bank regulators require the banks to separate LLPs from the 
matter of expected credit losses but at the same time to raise a sufficient capital to meet 
unexpected credit losses. Following this, the regulators are interested in decreasing 
pro-cyclical behaviour at the banks; in other words, they expect banks to raise their 
loan-loss reserves in financially good periods and otherwise take away resources from 
the reserves in financially difficult periods (i.e. when potentially high-risk loans 
actually default). As such, the bank managers’ attempt to follow capital adequacy 
regulations can result in earnings management at those banks. Although there is an 
extensive amount of literature in US banking studying income smoothing, those 
researches produced mixed results. The research by Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) 
found that regional banks had more tendency to get involved with income smoothing 
than money-centred banks. Ma (1988) reported that commercial banks in the US 
utilised LLPs and charge-offs to smooth out their reported earnings, albeit 
unexpectedly finding no evidence of the relationship between LLPs and loan portfolio 
quality. This could be interpreted that those bank managers used LLPs as a means to 
manage their earnings, raising their LLPs when operating income was high and vice 
versa. This was supported by the study by Collins et al. (1995), which also found a 
positive relationship between the two. Bhat (1996) claimed that small banks that were 
in bad financial conditions were more likely to engage in income smoothing, whilst 
Anandarajan et al. (2007) concluded that commercial banks in Australia were involved 
in earnings management, especially the ones that were publicly traded. 
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On the contrary, there were also researches that found no proofs of income smoothing, 
such as Scheiner (1981), Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty et al. (1995), and Ahmed 
et al. (1999). The last one in the list particularly did not find any proof of earnings 
management using LLPs, even after the enactment of Basel I, which was surprising 
since the new regulation that came with Basel I abolished the constraints regarding 
earnings management. Fonseca and Gonzàlez (2008) found that in developed and 
market-oriented financial systems, there was an increased motivation for earnings 
smoothing. According to the results of this study involving data about cross-country 
of income smoothing from banks from different countries, there were less incentives 
to smooth income in banking systems with increased levels of accounting disclosure 
and stricter limitations regarding banking activities. Bouvatier and Lepetits (2008) 
found empirical evidence that contradicted the income smoothing hypothesis: the 
European banks in their study decreased their LLPs as their pre-tax earnings and LLPs 
increased, which capitalised the cyclicality of LLPs because of the non-discretionary 
components (due to the higher earnings in periods of growth). Lastly, a study by 
Leventis et al. (2011) found overall evidence for the earnings management hypothesis, 
even though the implementation of IFRS in 2005 earnings management had noticeably 
decreased this practice. 
 
2.5 The regulatory impacts on the performance of external audit 
 
Whilst current literature has fairly covered the effects that auditors and regulators have 
on financial reporting, not much of it has been dedicated to studying how they affect 
financial reporting simultaneously. Amongst the researches that did, a certain number 
of studies investigated the more extreme consequences of the auditing process in the 
US banking context. Firstly, in Curry et al. (1999), the implementation of measures 
and CAMELS ratings downgrading were investigated, leading to the conclusion that 
the banks increased their loan loss provisions as a response to these measures. 
Following this, a study by Gunther and Moore (2003) claimed that supervisory 
inspections and external audits had a positive correlation with Call report statements, 
which resulted in loan loss provision revisions, which in turn led to increases. Later, 
Costello et al. (2015) examined supervisory leniency measured by the regulatory 
index, which was a result of Agarwal et al. (2014), and its effect on the prospect of 
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restatements for decreasing income. Although such an effect was found (with a 
negative association), the same could not be said for an effect related to the amount of 
external audit work.  
 
There were also other papers that focused more on the ongoing effects that regulators 
and auditors, by influencing loan loss provisions, had on financial reporting. Amongst 
them, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) discovered that unusual audit fees had a negative 
correlation with discretionary loan loss provisions, but this effect only existed for 
banks that were not susceptible to the internal control provisions by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) or Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX). This finding was interpreted to prove that, when auditors were presented with 
large unexpected fees and banks were not under internal control provisions, auditors 
would compromise their independence. As for regulators, Rezende and Wu (2014) 
studied the changes regarding how frequently on-site examinations were carried out 
and concluded that an increase in this frequency were related to decreases in loan loss 
provisions, non-performing loans, and charge-offs. These effects were interpreted as 
risk-taking in bank supervision discipline. On the contrary, an early study by Dahl et 
al. (1998) claimed that bank regulators increased charge-offs for commercial loans 
without adjusting loan loss provisions, whilst auditors did significantly increase 
provisions. The discrepancy in their findings could be accounted for by the strategy 
for identification or the differences in the time period sampled. Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010), studying how FDICIA’s internal control provisions influenced banking 
accounting quality, claimed that banks that had more than $500 million worth of assets 
enjoyed  more validity for loan loss provision and persistence in earnings, as well as 
less benchmark-beating and conservatism, compared to banks not susceptible to 
internal control provisions.  
 
More significantly, Nicoletti (2016), looking into how bank regulators and external 
auditors affect loan loss provisions in US state-chartered banks, in a relative 
comparison with national banks, from 1997 to 2005, found that amongst the state-
chartered banks receiving no external audits, those under strict regulatory scrutiny 
(measured by the regulatory index) would recognise concurrent (year t) and future 
(year t+1) non-performing loans in loan loss provision more than those under lenient 
regulatory scrutiny. Similarly, amongst the state-chartered banks subject to lenient 
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regulatory scrutiny, there were greater recognitions of the non-performing loans 
occurred in the audited banks than in the unaudited banks. It is clear that either of these 
individual effects was only significantly positive in the absence of any conflict 
between regulatory control and external audit. In the case of the occurrence of the 
conflict stemming from receiving external audit, there was no significant evidence for 
the differences in recognising the non-performing loans between those under strict and 
lenient regulatory scrutiny. By contrast, under the conflict coming from being subject 
to strict regulatory control, those receiving external audit would recognise the non-
performing loans less than those not being audited. From those empirical results, 
Nicoletti (2016) advocated that the recognition in loan loss provisions was influenced 
by regulatory control and external audit in different ways, and the impact of external 
audit on the recognition behaviour dominated that of regulatory control.   
 
From the current literature, it is advisable to suggest that both regulatory-supervisory 
controls and external audit yielded favourable influence on financial reporting since 
they corrected the recognition of loan loss provisions by banks. However, there were 
some pieces of evidence to illustrate the deficiencies of external audit in the 
information production with the absence of the US governmental controls. Even under 
strict regulatory scrutiny, external audit unfavourably influenced the recognition of the 
current and future risks in loan loss provisions, the inadequacies to some extent backed 
by the evidence of Nicoletti (2016). Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that 
the importance of external audit could be replaced by the regulation and supervision, 
since lenient regulatory scrutiny could be supplemented with external audit to improve 
the recognition in loan loss provisions, the supplement be evidenced in Nicoletti 
(2016). 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
As far as the introduction is concerned, banks are inclined to practice the discretion in 
provisioning loan losses to manage their capital and earnings, and thus reporting unfair 
and untrue accounting information about their business. Meanwhile, conducted by 
independent parties – mediators between principals and agents, external audit is 
supposed to reduce information asymmetries. From the literature review, it is clear that 
most of the preceding studies either focused on the association between discretionary 
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loan loss provisions and the quality of external audit without taking governmental 
intervention into consideration, or investigated how capital regulations influenced the 
managerial discretions through provisioning loan losses without involving the 
presence of external audits. There were a few of the studies examining the effects of 
regulators and external auditors on the quality of financial information at the same 
time, but mainly in the context of the United States banking system. Whereas, it seems 
that there is a lack of researches examining how the development of financial 
regulations and supervisions has influenced the performance of external audit or the 
quality of audited information, specifically regarding loan loss provisions in the EU 
banking system, which experienced the transition from not being isomorphic in 
Member States to being integrated into the single supervisory architecture. Motivated 
by this research gap, my research paper will aim to contribute an assessment on the 
influences of financial regulations and supervisions on audit quality in the EU banking 
system from 2001 to 2019. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Quantitative research approach 
 
With the objective of unveiling the effects of banking capital regulations and 
supervisions between the period 2001-2019 on the quality of audited financial 
information in the context of the European banking system, this research will, at first, 
identify the managerial discretions in loan loss provisioning by estimating 
discretionary LLPs (DLLPs), which will be in turn used to determine the proxy for 
audit quality. Secondly, by applying panel-data analysis, including fixed-effects and 
random-effects methods, together with the Hausman specification test on the 
consistence of the estimators of these models to make a selection, the research will 
regress independent variables relating to capital requirements, external audit, and bank 
specific characteristics on the dependent variable of audit quality. It is of great 
necessity to note that the legislation on banking regulations and supervisions in the EU 
banking system could be divided into 3 regimes: before 2006, 2006-2012, and 2013 
up to now, which will be treated as the period dummy variables interacting with the 
variables of capital requirements and external audit. This statistical analysis is 
expected to uncover how significantly the audit quality was influenced by capital and 
earning managements, to what extent the external audit efforts constrained these 
influences, and how the stringency of banking regulations and supervisions affected 
the audit quality through controlling external audit and capital management. Going 
further to capture the impact of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the 
European banking system, the third step will conduct the estimation of Difference in 
Difference between two groups which will be divided based on being less significantly 
supervised or significantly supervised by the European Central Bank under the SSM 
framework, and the panel-data estimations on sub-samples to determine to what extent 
the oversight of the Central Bank had affected the audit quality.  
 
3.1.1 Discretionary loan loss provisions and audit quality 
 
Although there is no unanimous model for estimating discretionary loan loss 
provisions, this estimate often draws on the investigation into the determinants of bank 
provisioning. In general, many studies (Wahlen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999; Beatty et 
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al., 2002; Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; Ng & Roychowdhury, 2011) mainly expressed 
loan loss provision as the function of non-discretionary loan factors in respect of total 
loans, non-performing loans, and loan loss reserves, thus taking the error terms from 
the pooled cross sectional and time series model estimation as the indicator of 
discretionary loan loss provisions. Drawing on the baseline model, this research will 
estimate discretionary loan loss provisions by the following modified empirical model 
(3.1) which will take GDP growth as a country indicator to control the 
macroeconomics effect on loan loss provisions. This is because the research will 
examine banks across the European area, different from the preceding studies focusing 
on banks within one country, either the United States or Brazil.  
 
(3.1) The pooled cross-sectional and time-series OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
specification:   
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝛥𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
• 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is provision for expected loan losses recorded at bank 
i at year t  
• 𝛥𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is change in the value of total loans of bank i during year t (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1) 
• 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 is the beginning balance in non-performing loans of bank i at year t, 
i.e., the ending balance in non-performing loans of bank i at year t - 1 
• 𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is change in non-performing loans of bank i during year t (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1) 
•  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the beginning balance in loan loss allowance of 
bank i at year t, i.e., the ending balance in loan loss allowance of bank i at year 
t - 1 
• 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a composite error term, taken as the measure of discretionary loan loss 
provisions (discretionary LLPs) 
• 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑛,𝑡 is change in Gross Domestic Product of country n  
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• All variables, except for GDP Growth, are normalised by the average of 
beginning and ending total assets at the corresponding year to mitigate 
potential heteroskedasticity problems. 
 
However, along with potential heterogeneity problems, it is worth considering that the 
result from the OLS regression (3.1) might be biased by the correlation of individual 
characteristics embodied in the errors term with independent variables, thus implying 
that discretionary loan loss provisions component from the OLS result might be subject 
to non-discretionary loan loss provisions component. Acknowledging the sources of 
possible bias in the research findings, this research will conduct the robustness 
analyses using the error term from the estimation with the fixed-effects model 
specification (3.2), after confirming whether this unique error term is associated with 
the non-discretionary regressors by Hausman test.  
 
(3.2) The fixed cross-sectional effects specifications: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝛥𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 
Where  
• 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is provision for expected loan losses recorded at bank 
i at year t  
• 𝛥𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is change in the value of total loans of bank i during year t (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1) 
• 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 is the beginning balance in non-performing loans of bank i at year t, 
i.e., the ending balance in non-performing loans of bank i at year t - 1 
• 𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is change in non-performing loans of bank i during year t (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1) 
•  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the beginning balance in loan loss allowance of 
bank i at year t, i.e., the ending balance in loan loss allowance of bank i at year 
t - 1 
• 𝛼𝑖  is a time-invariant specific individual effect  
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• 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term, taken as the measure of discretionary LLPs 
error term, taken as the measure of discretionary loan loss provisions 
(Discretionary LLPs) 
• 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑛,𝑡 is change in Gross Domestic Product of country n  
• All variables, except for GDP Growth, are normalised by the average of 
beginning and ending total assets at the corresponding year to mitigate 
potential heteroskedasticity problems. 
 
As far as the measurement of external audit quality is concerned, following Dantas and 
Medeiros (2014), this study will use the negative of the absolute value of the first 
difference in discretionary loan loss provisions as a proxy for external audit quality, 
rather than using directly the component of discretionary loan loss provisions, in spite 
of its relationship with external audit evidenced by the preceding studies. The main 
reason for taking the differential between the two periods is to capture the persistence 
of the behaviour of recognising accruals allowed by the external audit. Besides, it is of 
great necessity to take the absolute value, since this study focuses on the degree of 
discretionary loan loss provisions, which illustrates the accuracy of audited financial 
information, rather than the sign, which can be negative or positive, corresponding to 
increasing-income or decreasing-income. The negative value will indicate that the 
higher the proxy value is, the better the audit quality will be.  The formula for 
calculating audit quality is represented as follows: 
 
(3.3) 
AQi,t =  −|𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑠𝑖,𝑡  −  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1| 
Where: 
• 𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the quality of external audit at bank i at year t 
• 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the error term estimated from either the model (3.1) 
or the model (3.2) 
 
3.1.2 The influences on audit quality 
 
As discussed in the literature review, this research concentrates on the two managerial 
sources of practicing the discretions in the estimate of loan loss provisions. Firstly, 
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with the purpose of smoothing income, banks would understate or overstate loan loss 
provisions to achieve expected levels of income. Secondly, due to the regulatory 
capital requirements, banks poorly capitalised would be inclined to make less loan loss 
provisions. Such practices are expected to be alleviated by external auditing, thus 
implying that the persistence of the degree of discretionary loan loss provisions could 
reflect the level of discretionary accruals which the auditors concur with. As a result, 
it is reasonable to anticipate the significant relationship of external audit’s quality with 
the levels of capital and profitability, respectively indicated by capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) and return on equity (ROE). Additionally, the quality of external audit could 
also be influenced by how much effort auditors spent or how much they compromised 
their independence; therefore, the research will take the natural logarithm of audit fees, 
as well as its interactions with CAR and ROE as indicators for these features. The 
empirical model also controls the observable specific individual effects of internal 
audit and bank risks through taking into account the variables of internal audit 
committee independence, non-audit fee ratio, leverage, and liquidity. 
 
In the scope of this study, it is important to examine how stricter banking regulations 
and supervisions would influence the quality of external audit through requiring more 
paid effort from external audit, and through constraining capital management practices 
in the European banking system. Hence, the interactions of period dummies with the 
audit-fee indicator and capital adequacy ratio must be placed in the empirical model 
for estimating the influences on audit quality. Besides, it is worth noting that although 
having not been set out to control earnings management practices, the regulatory 
capital requirements influence the decisions on earnings management practices 
through loan loss provisions; thus, there is an expectation of the conditional effect of 
this discretion on the quality of external audit, the effect which will be captured 
through the interaction between CAR and ROE in the model. 
 
The empirical model (3.4) for estimating the influences on audit quality will be 
formulated as follows: 
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𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  θ0 +  θ1𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + θ2𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + θ3𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + θ4𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 +  θ5𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + θ6𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + θ7− θ8 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 
+ θ9− θ10 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  γ𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + δ𝑊𝑖,𝑡  +  αi + εit 
 
Where: 
• 𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the quality of external audit at bank i at year t, estimated from the 
equation (3.3) 
• 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is capital adequacy ratio of bank i at year t 
• 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of audit fees paid by bank i at year 
t 
• 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is return on equity of bank i at year t 
• 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 are dummies variables for the three phases of implementing 
international banking regulations and supervisions in the European banking 
system, with the base for the before-2006 period dummy 
• 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of regressors including observed variables relating to bank risk 
characteristics, including the liquidity ratio (total loans * 100/total deposit) 
and the leverage ratio [(total assets – total shareholder equity) * 100/average 
total assets]  
• 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a vector of regressors representing the characteristics of internal audit, 
including the index of audit committee independence and the non-audit fee 
ratio 
• 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are time-invariant effect and idiosyncratic error terms, respectively 
  
3.1.3 The influence of the Single Supervision Mechanism on external audit quality 
 
Last but not least, this section will suggest the statistical technique of difference in 
difference, in order to assess whether or not the legislative and international framework 
of Single Supervision Mechanism has favourable influence on the quality of external 
audit, as this framework has been granting the ECB the authority to directly supervise 
financial institutions which this central bank consider to be significant, and to leave 
less significant banks to their national authorities since 2014. Understanding that the 
ECB also possesses the determining-significance criteria in respect of size, economic 
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importance, cross-border activities, and direct public financial assistance, which could 
identify the quality of external audit, the study will presume that there is a difference 
in the quality of external audit between the two groups of significant banks and less 
significant banks before 2014, the initial difference needed to control. It is of great 
importance to acknowledge that in addition to the SSM intervention, there could be 
the presence of other factors which over time bring about disparate changes in the 
quality of external audit performed in the two groups, as the common time-trend 
difference would cause a bias on the estimation of the SSM impact on the group of 
significant banks unless being controlled. The graphical presentation for the 
difference-in-difference assumptions will be illustrated as follows:  
 
The difference-in-difference parameters will be estimated from the following OLS 
equation (3.5): 
AQit =  δ0 +  δ1𝑆𝑆𝑀 + δ2𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 + δ3𝑆𝑆𝑀 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑀
∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)  + ε𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
AQ - significant 
group 
AQ-less 
significant 
group 
AQ - less 
significant group 
AQ-significant 
group 
Impact of being 
significant or directly 
supervised 
Initial 
difference 
Time Trend 
Difference 
Before 2014 From 2014 
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• 𝐴𝑄i,t is the quality of external audit at bank i at year t, estimated from the 
equation (3.3) 
• 𝑆𝑆𝑀 is a time dummy variable with the value 0 for the years before 2014 (Pre-
SSM) and 1 for 2014 onwards (SSM) 
• 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 is a group dummy variable with the value 0 for the less 
significant banks and 1 for the significant (ECB-supervised) banks 
• 𝑆𝑆𝑀 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a dummy variable with the value 1 for the significant 
banks in the years from 2014, and 0 for the otherwise, i.e., an interaction term 
between the two dummy variables,  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − SSM and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝. 
 
Going beyond the assessment on whether the direct supervision of the ECB has 
affected the quality of external audit, this research will also aim to figure out how the 
predictors specified in the model 3.4 would differently affect the external audit’s 
quality of the two groups between the two periods. By doing so, the study will conduct 
sub-sample analyses with the specification of the model 3.4 but releasing related-to-
period dummy variables and the test of difference between two coefficients.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
3.2.1 Sample selection 
 
Based on the list of 565 equities from 27 European markets from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream, the research removed the duplicate equities issued by an identical bank 
entity, and eliminated equities issued by foreign entities outside the European areas, 
thus acquiring a bank list of 174 entities. In comparison with the lists of supervised 
and less supervised entities, firstly published in each year from 2014 to 2019 by the 
ECB, the bank list of 174 entities comprises 95 banks and bank holding companies 
either which or subsidiaries of which consistently appeared in the ECB’s lists over the 
period. It is necessary to note that 11 of the 95 banks and bank holding companies 
place their headquarters outside the 19 Eurozone EU Member States, but parts of them 
are still in the ECB’s lists. The distribution of the 95 banks and bank holding 
companies by country is illustrated below in Table 3.1.1. 
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Derived from Thomson Reuters DataStream, the panel data, used in the scope of this 
research, consists of accounting items in consolidated balance sheets and income 
statements of 95 banks and bank holding companies over the 2001 – 2019 period.  
 
Meanwhile, the macroeconomic data is extracted from the Eurostat database. The 
dataset is significantly representative of the banking system as these banks account for 
76% of total assets of the banking system and provide 94% of total loans of the whole 
system (estimated in 2018).   
 
Table 2. Distribution of banks and bank holding companies by country 
Country 
Number of 
banks 
 
Actual number of 
banks used in the 
estimates 
Austria 8  7 
Belgium 3  2 
Cyprus 3  2 
Estonia 1  - 
Finland 4  3 
France 4  4 
Germany 13  9 
Greece 5  5 
Ireland 5  4 
Italy 16  15 
Lichtenstein 1 Non-eurozone EU Member states 1 
Lithuania 3  3 
Malta 2  1 
Norway 1 Non-eurozone EU Member states 1 
Portugal 1  1 
Slovakia 3  3 
Slovenia 1  - 
Spain 9  9 
Sweden 3 Non-eurozone EU Member states 2 
Switzerland 4 Non-eurozone EU Member states 2 
The Netherlands 3  3 
United Kingdom 2 Non-eurozone EU Member states 2 
Total: 95  79 
 
3.2.2 The description of the dataset 
 
Drawing on the section 3.1 apropos of the estimate specifications, it is succinct when 
the variables are categorised into five groups: dependent variables, independent 
variables, bank risk-specific factors, internal audit-specific factors, and 
macroeconomic factors. Looking at the descriptive statistics in Table 3, it is noticeable 
that, loan loss provisions (LLPs), defined as expected losses from uncollectable or 
troubled loans, and taken as the regressand in the model 3.1 to estimate discretionary 
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loan loss provisions and construct a proxy for the quality of external, has a range from 
-2.3% to 17.7% with a mean of 0.59% of average total assets. The negative values 
indicate that prior to the year end, there was overestimation of loan loss reserves 
(allowances) needed lowering, when the quality of assets was improved by the 
recovery or expansion of economic environment. Meanwhile, the two explanatory 
variables at the bank level in the model 3.1, the ratios of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
and loan loss reserves (LLRs) over average total assets, have positive ranges from 
nearly 0% to respectively 83.1% and 37.1%, corresponding to means of 9% and 3.7%. 
The last variable in the model 3.1 is the growth of GDP, a macroeconomic factor, 
which ranges between -17.6% to 34.9%. 
 
As regards the main regressors in the model 3.4, capital adequacy ratio, whose 
relationship with the quality of external audit would indicate capital management, 
spreads from the negative value of -2.6% to 32.6% with a mean of 15.43%. There is 
only one negative ratio for National Bank of Greece in 2011, implying that the bank 
ended up with negative equities and faced with insolvency problems. Used to capture 
earning management, return on equity (ROE) has a wide range from -1444.47% to 
82.95% with an average ratio of 64.97%. The only one negative four-digit ratio 
(1444.5%) was also recorded for a Greece bank, Alpha Bank in 2012. Considered as a 
proxy for the effort of external audit, the natural logarithm of audit fees spans from 
10.65 to 18.59 on the logarithmic scale, corresponding to 1 thousand Euros to 118 
million Euros.  
 
Considering the controllable variables in the model 3.4, there are two regressors for 
each internal audit-specific control and bank risk-specific control. For the first control, 
this research uses the percentage of independent board members in audit committee 
and the ratio of non-audit fees over audit fees. The former indicator ranges from 0% 
to 100%, corresponding to having no independent members and having all independent 
members. The non-audit fee ratio is distributed from 0% to 464% with a mean ratio of 
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Table 3. Data description 
 Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Loan loss provisions  
(LLPs %, of av. total assets) 
878 0.5858 1.0108 -2.3259 17.7231 
Independent Variables 
Total loans  
(Loans %, of av. total assets) 
878 66.7940 16.9483 7.3534 122.6086 
Non-performing loans 
(NPLs %, of av. total assets) 
878 5.2025 9.0304 0.0014 83.1343 
Loan loss reserves 
(LLR %, of av. total assets) 
854 2.7239 3.7261 0.0192 37.1148 
Capital adequacy ratio (%) 608 15.4276 4.3896 -2.6 32.6 
The natural logarithm of audit fees (lnAF) 608 15.4214 1.5767 10.6490 18.5879 
Return on Equity 
(ROE, %) 
608 1.3363 64.9692 -1444.47 82.95 
Internal Audit Specific Factors 
Non-audit fee ratio (%) 442 37.3597 46.3330 0 464 
Audit committee independence (ACI) 472 80.7960 22.8214 0 100 
Bank Risk Specific Factors      
Leverage 
(LEV, %) 
608 95.3836 6.9075 74.1092 140.7816 
Liquidity 
(LIQ = LOANS/DEPOSITS, %) 
608 153.4838 82.3264 8.5464 980.5901 
Macroeconomic Factor 
GDP Growth (%) 608 2.9332  4.8664 -17.6213 34.9121 
 
37.36%. Meanwhile, the ratio of total liabilities to average total assets and that of total 
loans to deposits, indicating respectively leverage and liquidity, are taken into account 
for the second control. The leverage ratio is described with a range from 74.11% to 
140.78%, and an average ratio of 95.38%. Although the generally accepted leverage 
ratio spreads maximum to 100%, in this case, over 16.94% of the observations 
experience the leverage ratio of above 100%. The disparity from the maximum level 
is resulted mainly from the way of calculating this ratio by average total assets of the 
beginning and the ending of a year, rather than total assets reported at the year end, 
whilst using the ending of total liabilities, which can be significantly higher than the 
beginning amount. For the last controlled variable, with a mean of 153.48%, the 
liquidity ratio, indicating how much a bank exploits its deposit fund to supply more 
loans in exchange of reduction on its cash fund, ranges from 8.5% to 980.6%. 
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Table 4. Correlation matrices and Variance inflation factors of independent variables 
 Panel A: For the Equation 3.1 
Variables ΔLoans ΔNPLs NPLs t-1 LLR t-1 GDP growth 
ΔLoans 1     
ΔNPLs 0.1633 1    
NPLs t-1 -0.192 -0.2551 1 
  
LLR t-1 -0.2076 -0.1391 0.8328 1 
 
GDP Growth 0.1524 -0.1894 -0.0876 -0.0491 1 
      
 VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared  
ΔLoans 1.1 1.05 0.9072 0.0928  
ΔNPLs 1.38 1.17 0.7268 0.2732  
NPLs t-1 3.89 1.97 0.2573 0.7427 
 
LLR t-1 3.42 1.85 0.2924 0.7076 
 
GDP Growth 1.17 1.08 0.8549 0.1451  
Mean VIF 2.19     
 Panel B: For the Equation 3.4 
Variables CAR lnAF ROE 
Non-audit 
fee ratio 
ACI LEV LIQ 
CAR 1       
lnAF 0.0369 1      
ROE 0.134 0.0912 1     
Non-audit fee ratio  -0.0935 -0.0672 0.0127 1    
ACI 0.0077 0.0255 0.0908 0.1187 1   
LEV -0.2794 0.1245 0.0666 0.0169 0.0312 1  
LIQ -0.0187 -0.2384 -0.0522 0.0275 -0.0702 0.0045 1 
      
 VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-squared   
CAR 1.14 1.07 0.8801 0.1199   
lnAF 1.11 1.05 0.8987 0.1013  
ROE 1.05 1.02 0.9568 0.0432  
Non-audit fee ratio 1.03 1.02 0.9706 0.0294  
ACI 1.03 1.02 0.9671 0.0329  
LEV 1.17 1.08 0.8576 0.1424  
LIQ 1.07 1.04 0.9306 0.0694  
Mean VIF 1.08      
 
As respectively represented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4, the results on the 
correlation matrices and variance inflation factors for independent variables in 
equations 3.1 and 3.4 indicate that there is no explanatory variable highly correlated 
to others in each model, i.e. the multicollinearity is low, as the VIF for each 
independent variable is lower than 5. Hence, it is suggested that the proposed models 
are not subject to the multicollinearity problem. 
46 
 
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
4.1 Discretionary loan loss provision estimates 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the first stage of this research’s examination is 
set out to regress the non-discretionary component variables on the dependent variable 
of loan loss provisions with the aim of estimating the component of discretionary loan 
loss provisions, which will be used to construct the proxy for the quality of external 
audit. Although not deemed a central objective in this research, it is still essential to 
provide insights into how the non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions 
behave without controlling their counterparts and whether the behaviours are 
consistent with the preceding studies either including the two components in a one-
stage regression procedure or separating them in a two-stage regression procedure. As 
illustrated in Table 5, the relationships between loan loss provisions and the indicators 
of non-performing loans are consistently positive at the significance level of at least 
5%, which is aligned with the empirical results from the previous studies. The positive 
relationships indicate that expected losses are recognised through a backward-looking 
rule based on identifying concurrent problem loans. More specifically, a 100-euro-
higher level of change in non-performing loans (between the beginning and ending) 
and that of non-performing loans at the beginning of year would lead to an increase in 
loan loss provisions by 8.5 euros or 4.95 euros, respectively.  
 
Meanwhile, the coefficients on the variable of change in gross loans are negative, albeit 
inconsistently significant, implying an ambiguous association between the level of 
loan portfolio and loan loss provisions. Indeed, some of the previous studies, such as 
Wahlen (1994) and Beatty et al. (2002), included the variable set of differently 
categorised loans, rather than using total loans, to capture the variance in the 
expectation of loan losses for different types of loans. By contrast, without controlling 
the quality of loan portfolio, Garsva et. al (2012), using the one-stage OLS estimate 
approach, resulted in an insignificantly negative relationship of change in total loans 
with loan loss provisions for the EU-27 sample and for the EU-12 (new members) 
sample, but a significantly negative one for the EU-15 (old members). These empirical 
results implied that the quality of loan portfolio might be an unobserved bank-specific 
characteristic, or at least a bank-group-specific one. In alignment with the findings of 
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Garsva et. al (2012), this study comes up with a negative coefficient on change in total 
loans at the significance level of 5% by applying the fixed cross-sectional effects 
estimate.  
 
Table 5. Loan Loss Provisions 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Fixed effects-
Robust SE 
ΔLoans -0.0026 -0.0079** -0.0047 -0.0079** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
ΔNPLs 0.0850*** 0.0782*** 0.0829*** 0.0782*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) 
     
NPLs t-1 0.0495*** 0.0585*** 0.0547*** 0.0585** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.028) 
     
LLR t-1 0.0348** -0.0421** -0.0007 -0.0421 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.056) 
     
GDP Growth -0.0412*** -0.0321*** -0.0374*** -0.0321*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
     
Constant 0.3589*** 0.5029*** 0.4070*** 0.5029*** 
 (0.038) (0.043) (0.052) (0.048) 
F 119.9562 47.0818  19.5441 
R-squared 0.4095 0.2302  0.2302 
N 871 871 871 871 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test: The null hypothesis: Var(u) = 0 
                          Chi-bar-squared (01) = 10.12 
                          Prob > Chi-bar-squared = 0.0007 
Hausman test: The null hypothesis: difference in coefficients is not systematic 
                           Chi-squared (5) = 29.51 
                           Prob > Chi-squared = 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Similar to the variable of change in gross loans, there are contradictory results of the 
relationship between the beginning balance of loan loss reserves (allowances) and loan 
loss provisions in the OLS and fixed effects estimates, albeit consistently significant. 
Both types of this relationship possibly exist and are evidenced by previous researches. 
Whilst Wahlen (1994) found that a larger prior accumulation of accrued provisions 
would lead to smaller provisions recognised at the year-end, the results from Beatty et 
al. (2002) and Ng & Roychowdhury (2011) indicated loan loss provision recognised 
at the year-end would be increased by a larger amount of loan loss reserves at the 
beginning of the year. More than that, Garsva et. al (2012) found only a significantly 
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negative relationship between the beginning balance of loan loss reserves and loan loss 
provisions for the EU-15 (old members). Hence, it is reasonable to advise that this 
association is also affected by an unobserved bank-specific characteristic.  
 
Taken as a non-discretionary factor at the macroeconomic level, the growth rate of 
GDP has a consistently negative association with loan loss provisions at the 
significance level of 1%. Therefore, this research arrives at the same conclusions of 
Bouvatier & Lepetit (208), Leventis et al. (2011), Garsva et al. (2012), and Curio & 
Hasan (2015) about the procyclicality of provisioning expected loan losses, which 
means that banks are inclined to lessen loan loss provisions in the interest of their 
income in an economic downturn, and vice versa. 
 
Despite the fact that the explanation power of the fixed cross-sectional effects estimate 
is lower than those of the pooled cross-sectional and time-series estimate, the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test rejects the null hypothesis that the variance of the 
average pooled OLS residual is zero, i.e., there is no cross-sectional dependence. This 
implies that the cross-sectionally independent disturbances should be controlled at 
least by the random effects model which is also in turn rejected by the Hausman test, 
thus making the fixed effects model preferred. The reason for the reduction on the 
explanation power could come from the absence of time effects, which will be 
controlled in the second- and third-stage analyses. Nonetheless, this research will 
construct the proxy for audit quality by using the residuals of firstly the OLS estimate 
(AQ_OLS, i.e. audit quality from the OLS residuals) for the primary estimates, and 
then those of the fixed-effects estimate (AQ_FE, i.e. audit quality from the fixed cross-
sectional residuals) for the robustness estimates, in the successive analyses. 
 
4.2 The influences on audit quality 
 
With respect to the main research’s objective of examining the impact of stricter 
banking regulations and supervisions on the quality of external audit in the European 
banking system, the results represented in Column 1 and 2 of Table 6 indicate that the 
quality of external audit in the two periods of the Basel II and Basel III 
implementations was significantly lower than that in the period of the Basel I 
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implementation. Especially, the reduction in audit quality of the third period, relative 
to the first one (before 2005), was more economically and consistently significant, as 
both main and robustness estimates result in larger and statistically meaningful 
coefficients on the 2013-2019 period dummy. This deterioration in audit quality could 
be the repercussion of the Basel III’s provisioning standards which have enabled 
managers to practice discretions on loan loss estimates based on the management’s 
considerations about credit risk of each loan category, thus generating the persistence 
of discretionary loan loss provisions which the external auditors have either 
compromised on or overlooked. However, when taking more specific control for the 
impact of the Basel III implementation conditional on the interests received by or the 
corresponding effort spent by external audit, the estimates in Column 3 – 5 of Table 6 
result in significantly negative coefficients on the 2013 – 2019 period interaction term 
with the natural logarithm of audit fees, implying that the higher the audit fees were, 
the higher discretionary loan loss provisions were persistently accepted by external 
auditors. This finding remains unchanged in the robustness estimates in Table 7. 
Therefore, at first glance, it may be concluded that the stringency of the EU capital 
regulations has undesirably affected the quality of audited information regarding loan 
loss provisions, as well as reducing the effectiveness of the auditing costs in providing 
true and fair views on the LLPs information. These conclusions answer to the first 
research question. 
 
In alignment with Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), Garsva et al, (2012), and Curcio & 
Hansan (2015) examining the European banking industry, both main and robustness 
empirical results of this research, presented in Table 6 and Table 7, provide the 
evidence for capital managements, as the coefficients on CAR are negative, albeit 
inconsistently significant through all model specifications’ estimates. The negative 
relationship indicates that more capitalised banks experienced higher levels of 
persistent discretionary loan loss provisions than less capitalised banks, i.e. the quality 
of external audit performed in more capitalised banks was lower than in those poorly 
capitalised. Nonetheless, the capital management was to some extent constrained by 
stringency of capital-source requirements limiting the inclusion of loan loss provisions 
in the own funds, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficients on the 
interaction between the 2013-2019 period dummy and CAR. This evidence supports 
the conclusion that the rigorous capital requirements of Basel III in the EU banking 
50 
 
systems have achieved their purposes in mitigating managerial discretions on 
provisioning loan losses, in comparison with those of Basel I, thus contributing to a 
moderate improvement in the quality of audited information.  
 
Different from the findings of Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), this research comes up with 
meaningful evidence for earnings management in which banks with higher 
profitability levels have higher persistency in discretionary loan loss provisions or 
lower quality of external audit than those with lower profitability levels. In addition, 
all empirical estimates result in significantly positive coefficients on the interaction 
between CAR and ROE. These results illustrate that at the same level of CAR, banks 
with higher profitability levels had higher quality of external audit, i.e. the earnings 
management in these banks could be alleviated to some extent. It can be implied that 
despite only concerning about banks’ capital levels, the EU capital regulations have 
also influenced earnings management practices of EU banks, as they would force those 
banks to be considerate of their capital levels when provisioning loan losses.  
 
From the aforementioned pieces of evidence, it is reasonable to suggest that in overall, 
the quality of external audit in EU banks has been reduced under the capital 
regulations, which exacerbate discretionary behaviour towards meeting the ECB’s 
expectations regarding their bank capital levels. However, there have been changes 
tightening the capital requirements in order to restrain EU banks from discretionarily 
provisioning loan losses, thus easing the deterioration in the quality of audited 
information.  
 
Meanwhile, as illustrated in Table 6 and 4.2.2, the coefficients on the interactions of 
CAR and ROE with the natural logarithm of audit fees are significantly positive in 
some estimates including the full-specification ones. Although lacking consistency, 
those results provide some pieces of empirical evidence that more external audit efforts 
paid could alleviate capital and earnings managements, thus enhancing the quality of 
external audit. By contrast, there is no evidence for the direct influence of more paid 
audit efforts on the quality of external audit. 
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Table 6. Main estimates with the full sample 
All five regressions with the dependent variable of AQ_OLS (constructed by the OLS residuals), the fixed cross-sectional effects 
and the control for time periods are preferred over those with random effects by Hausman test. The first two columns illustrate the 
estimates using the period dummies, whilst in the last three columns, the period control becomes more specific through using the 
interactions of the period dummies with CAR and lnAF. The fourth and fifth estimates respectively include more internal-audit 
factors and bank-risk factors. All regression results are reported with robust standard errors, after conducting Hausman test. 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
AQ_OLS FE0 FE1 FER2 FER3 FER4 
Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR, %) 
0.0146 0.0410 -0.0363 -0.2008* -0.2131** 
(0.009) (0.093) (0.114) (0.104) (0.097) 
      
The natural logarithm of 
audit fees (lnAF) 
0.0642 0.0858 0.0944 -0.1326 -0.1240 
(0.092) (0.157) (0.149) (0.095) (0.089) 
      
Return on equity  
(ROE, %) 
-0.0008*** -0.0188* -0.0162* -0.0179* -0.0190* 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
c.CAR#c.lnAF  -0.0017 0.0000 0.0095* 0.0097** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
      
c.ROE#c.lnAF  0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
c.CAR#c.ROE  0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Period terms (with the base for the first period (2001 - 2005) 
2006-2012 -0.1542* -0.1398*    
 (0.083) (0.081)    
      
2013-2019 -0.2880*** -0.2781***    
 (0.094) (0.095)    
      
(2006-2012)#c.CAR   0.0264 0.0402 0.0477 
   (0.035) (0.049) (0.049) 
      
(2013-2019)#c.CAR   0.0620* 0.0734 0.0828* 
   (0.037) (0.048) (0.049) 
      
(2006-2012)#c.lnAF   -0.0265 -0.0322 -0.0380 
   (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) 
      
(2013-2019)#c.lnAF   -0.0670** -0.0699* -0.0785** 
   (0.027) (0.036) (0.037) 
Internal audit factors 
Non-audit fee ratio (%)    0.0005 0.0005 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Audit committee 
independence (ACI) 
   -0.0006 -0.0005 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank risk factors      
Leverage     -0.0017 
     (0.004) 
      
Liquidity     -0.0006 
     (0.000) 
      
Constant -1.3386 -1.7005 -1.2648 2.4652 2.6886 
 (1.349) (2.403) (2.472) (1.749) (1.776) 
F 6.0526 22.0723 19.6180 211.8698 395.0522 
R-squared 0.0116 0.0207 0.0255 0.0619 0.0641 
N 608 608 608 431 431 
Standard errors in parentheses  
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
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Table 7. Robustness estimates with the full sample  
All five regressions with the dependent variable of AQ_FE (constructed by the FE residuals), the fixed cross-sectional effects and 
the control for time periods are preferred over those with random effects by Hausman test. The first two columns illustrate the 
estimates using the period dummies, whilst in the last three columns, the period control becomes more specific through using the 
interactions of the period dummies with CAR and lnAF. The fourth and fifth estimates respectively include more internal-audit 
factors and bank-risk factors. All regression results are reported with robust standard errors, after conducting Hausman test. 
Dependent Variable: 
AQ_FE (Audit Quality) 
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
FE0 FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4 
Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR, %) 
0.0129 0.0360 -0.0350 -0.1836* -0.1972* 
(0.009) (0.083) (0.102) (0.109) (0.099) 
      
The natural logarithm of 
audit fees 
0.0521 0.0708 0.0799 -0.1211 -0.1042 
(0.088) (0.144) (0.136) (0.096) (0.089) 
      
Return on equity  
(ROE, %) 
-0.0005* -0.0190** -0.0167* -0.0191* -0.0210** 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
c.CAR#c.lnAF  -0.0015 0.0000 0.0081 0.0081* 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
      
c.ROE#c.lnAF  0.0011* 0.0010* 0.0012* 0.0013** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
c.CAR#c.ROE  0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Period terms (with the base for the first period (2001 - 2005) 
2006-2012 -0.1173 -0.1021    
 (0.077) (0.075)    
      
2013-2019 -0.2349*** -0.2241**    
 (0.086) (0.087)    
      
(2006-2012)#c.CAR   0.0268 0.0458 0.0554 
   (0.028) (0.051) (0.051) 
      
(2013-2019)#c.CAR   0.0576* 0.0753 0.0882* 
   (0.030) (0.049) (0.050) 
      
(2006-2012)#c.lnAF   -0.0247 -0.0340 -0.0419 
   (0.019) (0.035) (0.035) 
      
(2013-2019)#c.lnAF   -0.0598** -0.0670* -0.0794** 
   (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) 
Internal audit factors      
Non-audit fee ratio (%)    0.0005 0.0005 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Audit committee 
independence (ACI) 
   -0.0005 -0.0002 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank risk factors      
Leverage     -0.0036 
     (0.005) 
      
Liquidity     -0.0007 
     (0.000) 
Constant 
-1.1594 -1.4766 -1.0788 2.2962 2.6509 
(1.281) (2.192) (2.264) (1.799) (1.845) 
F 3.2611 13.5620 11.8245 88.8772 125.3926 
R-squared 0.0076 0.0186 0.0230 0.0516 0.0571 
N 608 608 608 431 431 
Standard errors in parentheses  
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
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4.3 The influence of the Single Supervision Mechanism on external audit quality 
 
In the context of the Eurozone area, the process of regulating and supervising the 
banking system has not only been the implementations of international standards 
within a country, but also the practices of the single supervisor ECB for the whole 
banking system of the Eurozone EU member states. It is expected that the new 
framework of the Single Supervision Mechanism would yield favourable influence on 
the quality of external audit. As illustrated respectively in Column 1 and 2 of Table 8, 
the pooled cross-sectional and time series estimates with the regressands of AQ_OLS 
and AQ_FE result in statistically significant coefficients on the time dummy variable 
(SSM), indicating the deterioration of external audit quality from 2014 (relative to 
before 2014). Meanwhile, the evidence for the meaningful influence of being directly 
supervised by the ECB is not consistent, since only the estimate with the dependent 
variable of AQ_FE shows a positive coefficient on the treatment dummy variable at 
the significance level of 10%.  
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
More than that, in order to answer the third research question, this research also looks 
into how the determinants of the external audit’s quality behave between the two 
groups, in the two periods of pre-SSM and SSM, with the aim of identifying which 
aspects have been improved to provide a better quality of external audit through the 
ECB’s direct supervision. It is worth noting that due to the division into four 
Table 8. Difference-in-difference estimates 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable AQ_OLS AQ_FE 
Supervised Group 0.0059 -0.0102 
 (0.105) (0.100) 
   
SSM -0.4053*** -0.4117*** 
(0.135) (0.129) 
   
SSM-Treatment 0.2647 0.2875* 
(0.161) (0.154) 
   
Constant -0.3051*** -0.2839*** 
(0.087) (0.084) 
F 4.5779 4.8054 
R-squared 0.0177 0.0185 
N 768 768 
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subsamples, the numbers of observations in the less significant groups are not enough 
to satisfy the degrees of freedom in the models with the full specification. Therefore, 
based on the F-statistics, the research decides to relax the period dummy interactions 
which would be omitted in the SSM subsamples’ estimates, and bank-risk factors.  The 
results of the regressions with the dependent variable of AQ_OLS are illustrated in 
Panel A of Table 9, together with the tests of difference in coefficients across the 
subsamples in Panel B of the same table. 
 
It is clear that before the SSM regime, the determinants of the external audit’s quality 
had behaved in the less significant and significant banks differently. More specifically, 
within the less significant banks, more capitalised banks would have a better quality 
of external audit than less capitalised one, whereas within the significant banks, the 
quality of external audit would be lower in banks with higher capital ratios, thus 
implying the practice of capital management. Similarly, the practice of earnings 
management is not proved within the less significant banks since the results indicate 
that banks with higher profitability levels would possess a better audit quality, whilst 
there is no statistically meaningful evidence for this discretion amongst the significant 
banks. Nonetheless, the empirical results depict there could be external audit’s 
compromises on the degrees of capital management and earning management within 
the less significant banks. By contrast, the external audit in the significant banks 
showed the effort on mitigating capital management, despite accepting a higher level 
of persistence of discretionary loan loss provisions in exchange for higher paid fees. 
These differences in the way of determining the quality of external audit performed in 
the two groups before the SSM are statistically significant, as illustrated in the first 
column of Panel B.  
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Table 9. Main estimates with subsamples 
 Panel A: Panel-data analyses on subsamples 
 Pre-SSM = 0 SSM = 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Less sig. = 0 Significant = 1 Less sig. = 0 Significant = 1 
Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR, %) 
0.6335* -0.3135* 0.1974 -0.0228 
(0.277) (0.164) (0.155) (0.207) 
     The natural logarithm of 
audit fees 
0.5925 -0.2549** -0.1444 -0.1727 
(0.331) (0.102) (0.215) (0.236) 
     Return on equity 
(ROE, %) 
0.3504** -0.0272 0.0433 -0.2475 
(0.106) (0.018) (0.096) (0.172) 
     c.CAR#c.lnAF -0.0392** 0.0176* -0.0089 0.0010 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
     c.ROE#c.lnAF -0.0190*** 0.0019 -0.0036 0.0143 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.011) 
     c.CAR#c.ROE -0.0046 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0011 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
     Non-audit fee ratio (%) -0.0028 0.0007* 0.0027 -0.0001 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
     Audit committee 
independence (ACI) 
-0.0022 -0.0000 0.0038* 0.0046 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
     Constant -9.6096* 4.1606** 0.3729 2.0943 
 (5.012) (1.727) (3.081) (3.703) 
F 1767.1935 826.7500 163.1196 12.9765 
R-squared 0.2634 0.1297 0.3511 0.0593 
N 55 190 45 141 
 Panel B: Tests of difference in coefficients across subsamples 
Regression columns (2) - (1) (3) - (1) (4) - (3) (4) - (2) [(4)-(3)]- [(2)-(1)] 
CAR coeff. diff. -0.947*** -0.4361* -0.2202 0.2907 0.7268* 
χ2 10.83 2.83 0.75 1.05 3.58 
P-value 0.001 0.0924 0.387 0.3053 0.0585 
lnAF coeff. diff. -0.8474*** -0.7369* -0.0283 0.0822 0.8191 
χ2 6.87 3.44 0.01 0.07 2.61 
P-value 0.0087 0.0638 0.9422 0.7942 0.1063 
ROE coeff. diff. -0.3776** -0.3071* -0.2908* -0.2203* 0.0868 
χ2 10.65 3.53 2.86 2.98 0.18 
P-value 0.0011 0.0604 0.091 0.0842 0.6756 
c.CAR#c.lnAF coeff. diff. 0.0568*** 0.0303* 0.0099 -0.0166 -0.0469** 
χ2 11.29 3.7 0.38 0.93 4.05 
P-value 0.0008 0.0545 0.5397 0.3337 0.0442 
c.ROE#c.lnAF coeff. diff. 0.0209*** 0.0154 0.0179 0.0124 -0.003 
χ2 10.47 1.76 2 2.32 0.04 
P-value 0.0012 0.185 0.1576 0.1275 0.8373 
c.CAR#c.ROE coeff. diff. 0.0047* 0.0046 0.0011 0.001 -0.0036 
χ2 3.62 1.83 0.13 0.25 0.81 
P-value 0.0571 0.1758 0.7134 0.6178 0.3689 
Non-audit fee coeff. diff. 0.0035** 0.0055** -0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0063** 
χ2 5.75 5.21 1.66 0.58 5.74 
P-value 0.0165 0.0225 0.197 0.4475 0.0166 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
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By contrast, as represented in Column 3 and 4 of Panel A, the influencing powers of 
all determinants are no longer statistically significant in both bank groups over the 
SSM period, with the exception of that of the audit committee independence indicator.  
In addition, the differences in the determinants’ behaviours of influencing the quality, 
except for ROE’s, between the two bank groups are statistically insignificant in the 
SSM period, as illustrated in the third column of Panel B. This indicates the 
convergence of those influences on the quality of external audit between in less 
significant banks and in significant banks over the SSM period.  
 
Considering the changes in the way of influencing the quality within the bank groups 
between the pre-SSM and SSM periods, the difference tests in the second column of 
Panel B illustrate significantly unfavourable changes in the influences of CAR, ROE 
and the natural logarithm of audit fees on the quality within the less significant group. 
Meanwhile, the determining behaviours of all influencers, except for ROE, remained 
unchanged over these two periods within the significant group, as represented in the 
fourth column of Panel B. Last but not least, as shown in the last column of Panel B, 
the tests on differences in coefficient differences aim to check the significance of 
changes in the influences on audit quality performed in the significant banks, relative 
to those performed in the less significant banks, between the pre-SSM and SSM 
periods, thus showing how the SSM framework has been affecting the quality of 
external audit. More particularly, the statistically significant positive difference in 
CAR coefficients’ differences implies that the ECB’s oversight of the significant banks 
could directly eliminate the practice of capital management in which the enhancement 
of CAR is associated with discretionarily provisioning practices, thus improving the 
quality of audited expected losses information reported by those banks. However, this 
oversight has failed to induce the capability of high payments for auditing effort to 
alleviate capital management practices in the significant banks, as evidenced by the 
statistically significant negative difference in differences of the coefficients on the 
interaction between CAR and the natural logarithm of audit fees. 
In addition, it is noticeable that before the SSM regime, the influence of non-audit 
services on the quality of external audit was stronger in the significant banks than in 
the less significant banks, which is proved by the significantly positive difference in 
non-audit fee ratio’ coefficients (in the first column of Panel B). However, the 
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competitive advantage effectiveness of non-audit services in providing true and fair 
accounting information in the significant banks, in comparison with in the less 
significant banks, has been cancelled out and even worsened under the SSM 
framework, since the result of difference in non-audit ratio’s coefficients differences 
is negative at the significance level of 5%. 
As represented in Table 10, the results from the robust estimates with the dependent 
variable of AQ_FE also support the differences in the behaviours of most of the 
influencers on the quality of external audit between the less significant banks and the 
significant banks before the SSM period, despite providing the magnitude and 
significance of estimated coefficients different from the main estimates with the 
dependent variable of AQ_OLS. Nevertheless, from the fourth column of Panel B in 
Table 10, it is noticed that the positive impacts of the SSM framework are no longer 
statistically significant, whereas the only negative impact on the effectiveness of non-
audit services is still significant at 5% in the robust estimates. 
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Table 10. Robust estimates on subsamples 
 Panel A: Panel-data analyses on subsamples 
 Pre-SSM = 0 SSM = 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Less sig. = 0 Significant = 1 Less sig. = 0 Significant = 1 
Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR, %) 
0.4841 -0.3043* 0.4026** 0.0336 
(0.349) (0.170) (0.162) (0.218) 
     The natural logarithm of 
audit fees 
0.2595 -0.2365** 0.0123 -0.0947 
(0.374) (0.110) (0.209) (0.305) 
     Return on equity  
(ROE, %) 
0.2767* -0.0258 0.0666 -0.2126 
(0.135) (0.017) (0.089) (0.146) 
     c.CAR#c.lnAF -0.0289 0.0171* -0.0228* -0.0028 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
     c.ROE#c.lnAF -0.0146** 0.0018 -0.0064 0.0126 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) 
     c.CAR#c.ROE -0.0043 0.0001 0.0016 0.0009 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
     Non-audit fee ratio (%) -0.0022 0.0005 0.0034 0.0000 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
     Audit committee 
independence 
0.0008 -0.0001 0.0020 0.0034 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
     Constant -4.8885 3.8817** -1.8457 1.0183 
 (5.528) (1.847) (3.087) (4.876) 
F 7029.8648 211.0215 243.1183 7.0704 
R-squared 0.2037 0.1194 0.4091 0.0458 
N 55 190 45 141 
 Panel B: Tests of difference in coefficients across subsamples 
Regression columns (2) - (1) (3) - (1) (4) - (3) (4) - (2) [(4)-(3)]- [(2)-(1)] 
CAR coeff. diff. -0.7884
*** -0.0815 -0.369 0.3379 0.4194 
χ2 6.98 0.08 1.94 1.42 1.11 
P-value 0.0082 0.771 0.1633 0.2341 0.293 
lnAF coeff. diff. -0.496 -0.2472 -0.107 0.1418 0.389 
χ2 2.16 0.35 0.07 0.19 0.54 
P-value 0.1419 0.5535 0.7938 0.665 0.4633 
ROE coeff. diff. -0.3025
** -0.2101 -0.2792* -0.1868 0.0233 
χ2 4.92 1.38 2.86 2.52 0.01 
P-value 0.0265 0.24 0.0907 0.1123 0.9134 
c.CAR#c.lnAF coeff. diff. 0.046
*** 0.0061 0.02 -0.0199 -0.026 
χ2 6.98 0.13 1.45 1.33 1.16 
P-value 0.0083 0.7194 0.229 0.2496 0.2824 
c.ROE#c.lnAF coeff. diff. 0.0164
** 0.0082 0.019 0.0108 0.0026 
χ2 4.54 0.43 2.36 2.05 0.03 
P-value 0.033 0.5099 0.1245 0.1518 0.8574 
c.CAR#c.ROE coeff. diff. 0.0044 0.0059 -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0051 
χ2 2.29 2.46 0.05 0.18 1.46 
P-value 0.1306 0.1171 0.8251 0.6685 0.2275 
Non-audit fee coeff. diff. 0.0027
* 0.0056** -0.0034 -0.0005 -0.0061** 
χ2 2.73 4.54 2.2 0.25 4.71 
P-value 0.0985 0.0331 0.138 0.6195 0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
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4.4 Policy implication 
 
In light of the findings, it is sensible to suggest that the EU banking capital 
requirements have had an undesirable impact on the quality of external audit because    
the prolonging pressure to achieve regulatory capital levels has induced discretionary 
practices on provisioning loan losses. On the other hand, the changes in the EU 
banking regulations, which could be divided into the three periods of implementing 
the international banking regulations and supervisions (Basel Accords), have been 
effective in mitigating those discretions, but not eliminating them, thus improving the 
quality of audited information to some extent. Meanwhile, the specific scheme of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism in the EU banking system has been of benefit to the 
quality of external audit through restraining the significant banks from practicing 
discretionary capital. However, under this oversight, the effectiveness of both audit 
and non-audit services in enhancing the quality of audited information has been 
reduced at the significant banks.  The reason might come from the concentration of the 
EU banking regulations and supervisions, as well as the SSM framework, on EU 
banks’ capital levels, rather than on monitoring the responsibility of external audit in 
providing true and fair accounting information.  
 
From this viewpoint, it could be better for the EU banking system, especially the less 
significant banks, if the ECB supervises and regulates the responsibility of companies 
providing auditing and accounting services for financial institutions, especially in the 
case that the costs for the ECB’s control on these service companies are smaller than 
those for the ECB’s direct supervisions on all banks. By doing so, it might not only 
improve the quality of audited information at the less significant banks, but also correct 
the negative impact of the direct supervision on the effectiveness of auditing services 
at the significant banks, as the process of obtaining information of external audit will 
be supervised, and the independence and objectivity of external auditors will be 
protected by the regulators. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
In the interests of the stability and resilience of the EU banking system, stringent 
capital regulations in accordance with Basel II and Basel III have been put forth since 
2006 in order to replace the Capital Adequacy Directive. These requirements have not 
only rendered the banks’ exposure estimates more complex, but also given banks’ 
managers more motivation and space to practice managerial discretions regarding loan 
loss provisions.  As a result, there has been a higher pressure on external auditors to 
have a good understanding of the new and intricate internal assessment systems that 
are used for categorising assets and evaluating the risks of asset portfolios. If 
discretionary practices go unnoticed by the external auditors, the financial difficulties 
of the audited banks will not be reflected in the audited consolidated financial 
statements. As discussed in 1.1.2, indeed, external auditors have consecutively failed 
in their role as an independent mediator between managers and stakeholders. However, 
it is unclear as to how more stringent banking regulations and supervisions in the EU 
banking system will affect the quality of reported loan loss provisions by external 
audit. Finding the answer to this has another potential impact: showing a proof for the 
necessity of governmental interventions in managing the external audit’s creditability 
of financial information. 
 
With the aim of uncovering how banking capital regulations and supervisions from 
2001 to 2019 affected the quality of audited financial information within the EU 
banking system, this research firstly discovered managerial discretions in loan loss 
provisioning through estimating discretionary LLPs (DLLPs), which were then used 
for determining the proxy for audit quality. Secondly, this research applied panel-data 
analysis to regress capital requirements, the cost of external audit, and bank-specific 
characteristics on audit quality. The three regimes in which the legislation for the 
European banking system was divided (i.e. pre-2006, 2016-2012, and post-2013) were 
treated as dummy variables for period, interacting with capital adequacy ratios and the 
natural logarithm of external audit. This analysis aimed to discover the followings: the 
influences of capital and earning managements on audit quality, the extent to which 
such influences were constrained by paid efforts of external audit, and the impact of 
more stringent banking regulations and supervisions on audit quality. Thirdly, this 
research attempted to uncover how the Single Supervisor Mechanism (SSM) impacted 
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the European banking system by carrying out a Difference in Difference estimation 
between two groups: banks that have been considered to be less significant and be 
significant by the European Central Bank. This third step also conducted panel-data 
estimations on sub-samples, in order to find out how much the Central Bank’s 
supervision affected the audit quality. 
 
Regarding the first research question, the full sample analysis of the panel-data 
revealed at first sight that more stringent capital regulations from the EU has had an 
undesirable effect on the quality of audited information (in terms of loan loss 
provisions) and has rendered auditing costs less effective in bringing about true and 
fair views on LLPs. Nevertheless, the capital requirements under Basel III have served 
their purpose of attenuating managerial discretions in terms of provisioning loan losses 
(compared to those in Basel I). This has helped moderately improving the quality of 
audited information. The sub-sample analyses showed that before the SSM period, 
there were differences in the behaviours of most of the factors that affected external 
audit’s quality, between the two groups of less significant and significant banks. The 
SSM scheme in the EU banking system has benefited the external audit’s quality by 
hindering the significant banks’ discretionary capital practices. Nonetheless, under this 
superintendence, the significant banks have seen both audit and non-audit services 
decreased their effectiveness in improving audited information’s quality. 
 
Albeit acknowledging that the limitation in the data size could have biased the 
findings, this research is expected to provide a moderate contribution by providing an 
analytical insight into the impacts of the banking regulations and supervisions on the 
performance of external audit in the EU banking system. Through the analytical 
findings, it is advised that it might be beneficial for the performance of external audit 
in both significant and less significant banks as the companies providing audit and 
non-audit services are under governmental regulations and supervisions, if the cost of 
this is lower than the direct supervisions on both bank groups. 
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